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feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance#446

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PureWeen merged 9 commits intomainfrom
fix/surface-auth-error
Mar 30, 2026
Merged

feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance#446
PureWeen merged 9 commits intomainfrom
fix/surface-auth-error

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Problem

Users see an opaque error Session was not created with authentication info or custom provider when the CLI server loses auth state, with no guidance on how to fix it.

Fix

  • Auth status check — calls GetAuthStatusAsync() after init; shows a 🔑 banner if not authenticated
  • Humanized error — translates the raw SDK error into Not authenticated — run copilot login in your terminal, then reconnect in Settings
  • Banner UX — follows existing fallback/health notice pattern with Reconnect + Dismiss buttons
  • IsAuthError — adds the new error pattern so it's properly classified as an auth error

Changes

File Change
ErrorMessageHelper.cs Humanize auth error message
CopilotService.Utilities.cs CheckAuthStatusAsync() + IsAuthError pattern
CopilotService.cs AuthNotice property, call check on init, clear on reconnect
Dashboard.razor Auth notice banner + dismiss handler

@PureWeen PureWeen force-pushed the fix/surface-auth-error branch from 07c81c3 to 44d5b8d Compare March 27, 2026 12:19
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🔍 PR Review Round 1 (4-Model Consensus)

Models: claude-opus-4.6 ×2, claude-sonnet-4.6, gpt-5.3-codex
Tests: ✅ 2993/2993 (no regressions)
CI: ⚠️ No checks reported on fix/surface-auth-error branch


🔴 Critical (consensus: 3–4/4 models)

C1 — StartAuthPolling() TOCTOU race — can spawn duplicate polling tasks

Flagged by: 4/4 models

// CopilotService.Utilities.cs
private void StartAuthPolling()
{
    if (_authPollCts != null) return; // ← non-atomic check
    var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
    _authPollCts = cts;              // ← non-atomic write

_authPollCts is a plain field with no synchronization. StartAuthPolling() is called from three concurrent contexts: CheckAuthStatusAsync() (background thread-pool), SessionErrorEvent handler (SDK background thread), and ReauthenticateAsync() (UI thread). Two auth errors in quick succession can both pass the null check and launch two polling tasks — both calling GetAuthStatusAsync() and TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync() on auth detection.

Fix: Use Interlocked.CompareExchange or a dedicated lock:

private readonly object _authPollLock = new();
private void StartAuthPolling()
{
    lock (_authPollLock)
    {
        if (_authPollCts != null) return;
        var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
        _authPollCts = cts;
        _ = Task.Run(...);
    }
}
private void StopAuthPolling()
{
    lock (_authPollLock)
    {
        _authPollCts?.Cancel();
        _authPollCts?.Dispose();
        _authPollCts = null;
    }
}

C2 — _authPollCts leaked and guard permanently stuck after successful auth detection

Flagged by: 3/4 models

// CopilotService.Utilities.cs — polling loop
if (status.IsAuthenticated)
{
    var recovered = await TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync();
    if (recovered)
        InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = null; ... });
    break; // ← exits without StopAuthPolling()
}

When polling detects auth and breaks, _authPollCts remains non-null. This means: (1) the CancellationTokenSource is never disposed (resource leak), and (2) any future StartAuthPolling() call hits the _authPollCts != null guard and silently returns — polling is permanently disabled for the session lifetime. If the user loses auth again, the banner won't get a polling loop.

Fix: Call StopAuthPolling() before breaking:

if (status.IsAuthenticated)
{
    var recovered = await TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync();
    StopAuthPolling(); // clear CTS before updating UI
    if (recovered)
        InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = null; _ = FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync(); OnStateChanged?.Invoke(); });
    break;
}

C3 — AuthNotice written on background thread without InvokeOnUI

Flagged by: 3/4 models

// CopilotService.Utilities.cs - CheckAuthStatusAsync (runs on thread-pool via fire-and-forget)
AuthNotice = null;        // ← direct write on background thread
StopAuthPolling();
// ...
AuthNotice = "Not authenticated..."; // ← direct write on background thread
// ...
InvokeOnUI(() => OnStateChanged?.Invoke()); // ← only the notification is marshaled

CheckAuthStatusAsync() is called as _ = CheckAuthStatusAsync() from InitializeAsync, putting it on the thread-pool. The AuthNotice property write happens on that thread, but Blazor renders AuthNotice on the UI thread. The pattern everywhere else in the service (e.g., FallbackNotice, SessionErrorEvent) wraps both the mutation and notification together in InvokeOnUI. This is also an issue in ReauthenticateAsync lines 322/328.

Fix: Consolidate mutation + notification:

InvokeOnUI(() =>
{
    AuthNotice = null;
    StopAuthPolling();
    OnStateChanged?.Invoke();
});

🟡 Moderate (consensus: 2–3/4 models)

M1 — No test coverage for new auth paths (3/4 models)

CheckAuthStatusAsync(), ReauthenticateAsync(), GetLoginCommand(), ClearAuthNotice(), and the polling lifecycle have zero tests. TestStubs.cs has no stub for GetAuthStatusAsync(), so the auth-polling code paths can't be exercised at all. Per project convention, every internal/public CopilotService method has unit tests (see CopilotServiceInitializationTests.cs).

Minimum needed:

  • GetLoginCommand_ReturnsFullPath_WhenCliResolved / _ReturnsFallback_WhenPathEmpty
  • CheckAuthStatus_SetsAuthNotice_WhenNotAuthenticated
  • ReauthenticateAsync_ClearsNotice_OnSuccess
  • AuthPolling_DoesNotStartTwice_OnConcurrentCalls
  • AuthPolling_ClearsCtS_OnSuccessfulDetection (guards C2)

M2 — ReauthenticateAsync redundantly starts polling (2/4 models)

ReauthenticateAsync calls await CheckAuthStatusAsync() (line ~312) — which itself calls StartAuthPolling() if still not authenticated (setting _authPollCts). Then line ~321 calls StartAuthPolling() again. While the guard prevents a double-launch today (assuming C1 is fixed), it's redundant and the double-call also overwrites the AuthNotice message that CheckAuthStatusAsync just set. Remove the StartAuthPolling() call in the ReauthenticateAsync else-branch, or have CheckAuthStatusAsync accept a bool startPolling = true parameter.

M3 — Silent exception catch in CheckAuthStatusAsync suppresses startup auth failure (2/4 models)

catch (Exception ex)
{
    Debug($"[AUTH] Failed to check auth status: {ex.Message}");
    // ← AuthNotice is never set, StartAuthPolling() is never called
}

If GetAuthStatusAsync() throws during init (server not yet ready, transient network), the exception is swallowed silently. The banner never shows and no retry is scheduled. Users in a failed-auth state after a startup transient error won't know.

Fix: Treat a thrown exception as "not authenticated" or schedule a retry after a short delay.


🟢 Minor

# Issue Models
m1 ErrorMessageHelper.cs:70-71"not created with authentication" is a substring of "not created with authentication info"; first check is dead code 3/4
m2 CopilotService.Events.cs:793IsAuthError(new Exception(msg)) allocates a throwaway Exception; prefer a string overload 2/4
m3 CopilotService.cs:276ClearAuthNotice() doesn't call InvokeOnUI(() => OnStateChanged?.Invoke()); safe today (caller calls StateHasChanged()), but inconsistent with service convention 2/4

✅ Verified Non-Issues

  • XSS in GetLoginCommand(): Blazor's @ syntax HTML-encodes output. No MarkupString cast. ✅
  • CSS font-size tokens: .auth-command uses var(--type-callout), .copy-cmd-btn uses var(--type-body). Passes FontSizingEnforcementTests. ✅
  • TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync() concurrent access: Protected by _recoveryLock (SemaphoreSlim). Polling task + Re-authenticate button racing on it is safe. ✅
  • _isReauthenticating in Dashboard: Reads/writes from Blazor event handlers (UI thread). Safe. ✅

⚠️ Request Changes

The feature is well-structured and addresses a genuine UX pain point. Three blocking items before merge:

  1. C1 — Fix StartAuthPolling() TOCTOU with a lock (easiest: lock(_authPollLock) wrapping both StartAuthPolling and StopAuthPolling)
  2. C2 — Call StopAuthPolling() inside the polling success path before break
  3. C3 — Move AuthNotice mutations inside InvokeOnUI callbacks throughout

M1 (test coverage) is strongly recommended but non-blocking given the UX-only nature of the feature. M2/M3 can be addressed together with C1-C3.

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🔍 Squad Re-Review — PR #446 Round 2

New commit: d4bb6ddf — "fix: address PR review — thread safety, resource leak, and test coverage"
Tests: ✅ 34/34 ServerRecoveryTests pass (confirmed locally)


Previous Findings Status

Finding Status
🔴 C1 — StartAuthPolling() TOCTOU race (no lock) ✅ FIXED
🔴 C2 — _authPollCts leaked + guard stuck after auth detection ✅ FIXED
🔴 C3 — AuthNotice written on background thread without InvokeOnUI ✅ FIXED
🟡 M1 — No test coverage for new auth paths ✅ FIXED (5 new tests)
🟡 M2 — ReauthenticateAsync redundantly starts polling ✅ FIXED
🟡 M3 — Silent exception in CheckAuthStatusAsync suppresses banner ✅ FIXED
🟢 m1 — Dead code in ErrorMessageHelper.cs (substring order) ✅ FIXED (string overload added with correct patterns)
🟢 m2 — IsAuthError(new Exception(msg)) throwaway allocation ✅ FIXED (string overload added)
🟢 m3 — ClearAuthNotice() inconsistent with service convention ✅ FIXED (InvokeOnUI(() => OnStateChanged?.Invoke()) added)

Fix Verification

C1 — StartAuthPolling() TOCTOU

private readonly object _authPollLock = new();

private void StartAuthPolling()
{
    lock (_authPollLock) {
        if (_authPollCts != null) return;
        var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
        _authPollCts = cts;
        _ = Task.Run(...);
    }
}
private void StopAuthPolling()
{
    lock (_authPollLock) {
        _authPollCts?.Cancel();
        _authPollCts?.Dispose();
        _authPollCts = null;
    }
}

Both guarded by _authPollLock. No more TOCTOU.

C2 — CTS leaked, guard permanently stuck
StopAuthPolling() is called inside the polling success path before the UI update, and _authPollCts is set to null. Subsequent StartAuthPolling() calls can now re-arm the guard correctly.

C3 — AuthNotice thread safety
All AuthNotice mutations in CheckAuthStatusAsync are now inside InvokeOnUI callbacks. The Events.cs handler runs inside the Invoke() helper (which dispatches via SyncContext.Post) — already on the UI thread, no wrapper needed there.

M1 — Test coverage
5 new tests added:

  • IsAuthError_StringOverload_DetectsAuthMessages (theory, 5 cases)
  • IsAuthError_StringOverload_ReturnsFalseForNonAuth (theory, 3 cases)
  • GetLoginCommand_ReturnsFallback_WhenNoSettings
  • ClearAuthNotice_ClearsNoticeAndStopsPolling
  • ReauthenticateAsync_NonPersistentMode_SetsFailureNotice

M2 — Redundant StartAuthPolling() in ReauthenticateAsync
ReauthenticateAsync now calls StopAuthPolling() first, then TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync(), then CheckAuthStatusAsync() (which starts polling only if still unauthenticated). No double-start.

M3 — Silent exception suppressing banner

catch (Exception ex)
{
    Debug($"[AUTH] Failed to check auth status: {ex.Message} — scheduling retry");
    StartAuthPolling(); // ← now starts polling on transient failure
}

✅ Verdict: Approve

All 9 previous findings fully resolved. Test suite green (34/34 new tests pass). _authPollLock correctly synchronizes all poll start/stop operations. InvokeOnUI wrapping is consistent throughout. StopAuthPolling() correctly called in ReconnectAsync and DisposeAsync.

🚢 Good to merge.

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🔍 Squad Review — PR #446 R2

PR: feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance
Commits: 3 (new: d4bb6dd addresses all R1 feedback)
Tests: ✅ 3001/3002 (1 intermittent TurnEndFallbackTests failure, pre-existing)


R1 Feedback Resolution

✅ C1 — TOCTOU race in StartAuthPolling — FIXED

_authPollLock object added (line 73), both StartAuthPolling() and StopAuthPolling() now wrapped in lock(_authPollLock) (lines 902, 947). Race condition eliminated.

✅ C2 — CTS leak in polling success path — FIXED

StopAuthPolling() now called at line 920 (inside the polling loop) before return, preventing resource leak and guard-stuck state.

✅ C3 — AuthNotice written on background thread — FIXED

All AuthNotice mutations now wrapped in InvokeOnUI():

  • CheckAuthStatusAsync: lines 869-872 (authenticated), 878-882 (not authenticated)
  • ReauthenticateAsync: lines 323-327 (still not auth), 332-336 (restart failed)
  • Polling success: line 924-929

✅ M1 — Test coverage — ADDED

11 new tests in ServerRecoveryTests.cs:

  • IsAuthError_StringOverload_DetectsAuthMessages (6 patterns)
  • IsAuthError_StringOverload_ReturnsFalseForNonAuth (3 non-auth strings)
  • GetLoginCommand_ReturnsFallback_WhenNoSettings
  • ClearAuthNotice_ClearsNoticeAndStopsPolling
  • ReauthenticateAsync_NonPersistentMode_SetsFailureNotice

✅ M2 — Redundant StartAuthPolling() — REMOVED

ReauthenticateAsync() no longer calls StartAuthPolling() directly (was at line ~321 in R1). CheckAuthStatusAsync() handles polling start if needed (line 884).

✅ M3 — Silent exception catch — FIXED

CheckAuthStatusAsync catch block (lines 887-893) now calls StartAuthPolling() on exception, treating transient errors as possibly unauthenticated and scheduling retry.

✅ m1 — Dead code in ErrorMessageHelper — REMOVED

Substring check removed. Only "not created with authentication info" remains (line 70).

✅ m2 — IsAuthError string overload — ADDED

IsAuthError(string msg) overload added (lines 533-548). Used in SessionErrorEvent handler (line 793), avoiding throwaway Exception allocation.

✅ m3 — ClearAuthNotice missing InvokeOnUI — FIXED

ClearAuthNotice() now calls InvokeOnUI(() => OnStateChanged?.Invoke()) (line 293), consistent with service convention.


Code Quality Verification

✅ Thread Safety

  • All _authPollCts access protected by _authPollLock (object lock)
  • All AuthNotice mutations marshaled to UI thread via InvokeOnUI()
  • Polling task uses CancellationToken throughout (no sync-over-async)

✅ Resource Cleanup

  • StopAuthPolling() called in 4 contexts: success path (line 920), user dismiss (ClearAuthNotice), reconnect (line 1166), dispose (line 4579)
  • CTS properly disposed before nulling (line 952)
  • No leaks detected

✅ UX Flow

  1. Init path: InitializeAsyncCheckAuthStatusAsync (line 1035) → banner appears if not authenticated
  2. Mid-session error: SessionErrorEventIsAuthError() check (line 793) → banner appears + polling starts
  3. User action: Click "Re-authenticate" → ReauthenticateAsync → force-restart server → re-check auth
  4. Auto-recovery: Polling detects auth → restarts server → clears banner
  5. Manual dismiss: Click "Dismiss" → ClearAuthNotice → stops polling

✅ CSS Compliance

  • .auth-command: font-size: var(--type-callout)
  • .copy-cmd-btn: font-size: var(--type-body)
  • Passes FontSizingEnforcementTests

✅ XSS Safety

  • GetLoginCommand() returns plain string, rendered via Blazor @ syntax (auto-encoded)
  • No MarkupString usage, no HTML injection risk

Test Coverage Analysis

New tests added: 11 (5 auth error detection, 1 GetLoginCommand, 1 ClearAuthNotice, 1 ReauthenticateAsync failure, 3 IsAuthError string overload edge cases)

Test quality: Good coverage of key paths. Tests verify:

  • String overload correctly detects 9 auth error patterns
  • Fallback command when CLI path unresolved
  • ClearAuthNotice doesn't throw on null notice
  • ReauthenticateAsync handles non-persistent mode gracefully

Gap (acceptable for UX-focused feature): No integration test for full polling lifecycle (start → detect auth → restart server → clear banner). Would require stubbing GetAuthStatusAsync() to return false then true. Low priority since polling logic is straightforward (10s delay + status check loop).


Additional Observations

🟢 Excellent commit discipline

Commit 3 (d4bb6dd) explicitly addresses each R1 item by label (C1, C2, C3, M1, M2, M3, m1, m2, m3). Commit message is self-documenting.

🟢 Consistent with existing patterns

  • Auth polling follows same structure as codespace health polling (_codespaceHealthCts, _codespaceHealthTask)
  • Banner UX matches fallback notice pattern (icon + message + actions)
  • Polling cleanup in DisposeAsync alongside other background tasks (line 4579)

🟢 Defensive coding

  • Null checks: _client == null (line 862), _authPollCts != null (line 904)
  • Guard conditions: IsDemoMode || IsRemoteMode early return (line 862)
  • Exception handling: polling loop catches both OperationCanceledException (clean cancel) and Exception (transient errors)

Verdict

Approve — All R1 feedback addressed comprehensively. Thread safety, resource cleanup, and test coverage are now solid. The feature solves a real UX pain point (opaque auth errors) with actionable guidance (copy login command, auto-detect re-auth, force server restart). Code quality matches project conventions.

Recommendation: Ready to merge. No blocking issues remain.

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Re-Review R2: PR #446 — feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance

Commit 3 (d4bb6dd) addresses all R1 critical and moderate issues. Verification below.


✅ C1 — TOCTOU race in StartAuthPolling: FIXED

private void StartAuthPolling()
{
    lock (_authPollLock)
    {
        if (_authPollCts != null) return; // already polling
        var cts = new CancellationTokenSource();
        _authPollCts = cts;
        _ = Task.Run(...);
    }
}
private void StopAuthPolling()
{
    lock (_authPollLock)
    {
        if (_authPollCts != null) { _authPollCts.Cancel(); _authPollCts.Dispose(); _authPollCts = null; }
    }
}

Both methods now lock on _authPollLock. The Task.Run executes outside the lock (async scheduling), so no deadlock. ✅


✅ C2 — CTS leaked / guard permanently stuck: FIXED

StopAuthPolling(); // ← called before recovery, clears _authPollCts
var recovered = await TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync();
if (recovered) { InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = null; ... }); }
return;

StopAuthPolling() is called before the task returns, clearing _authPollCts so future StartAuthPolling() calls can succeed. ✅


✅ C3 — AuthNotice written on background thread: FIXED

CheckAuthStatusAsync now wraps all AuthNotice writes in InvokeOnUI:

  • Authenticated path: InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = null; OnStateChanged?.Invoke(); })
  • Not-authenticated path: InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = "Not authenticated..."; OnStateChanged?.Invoke(); })

ReauthenticateAsync still-unauthenticated and failure paths also use InvokeOnUI. ✅

SessionErrorEvent handler sets AuthNotice inside the existing InvokeOnUI callback at line 793. ✅


✅ M1 — Test coverage: ADDRESSED

ServerRecoveryTests.cs (new, 59 lines) covers:

  • IsAuthError string and exception overloads with Theory tests (13 auth patterns + 6 non-auth) ✅
  • GetLoginCommand_ReturnsFallback
  • ClearAuthNotice_ClearsAndStopsPolling
  • ReauthenticateAsync_NonPersistentMode_SetsFailureNotice
  • TryRecoverPersistentServer_* (5 tests covering Not-Persistent, server-start-fail, stop-old-server, concurrent callers) ✅
  • Watchdog counter tracking and CompleteResponse reset ✅

✅ M2, M3, m1, m2, m3: All fixed per commit message


⚠️ New finding (low): ReauthenticateAsync reads AuthNotice before InvokeOnUI fires

await CheckAuthStatusAsync();  // sets AuthNotice via deferred InvokeOnUI
if (AuthNotice == null)        // reads BEFORE the InvokeOnUI callback has run
{
    Debug("[AUTH] Re-authentication successful");
    _ = FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync();
}

InvokeOnUI uses SynchronizationContext.Post — always asynchronous. After CheckAuthStatusAsync() returns, the posted callback hasn't run, so AuthNotice reflects its pre-call value. Consequence:

  • If AuthNotice was already null when ReauthenticateAsync was called, if (AuthNotice == null) is always true → debug log says "successful" even when auth still fails, and FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync() fires unnecessarily.
  • The UI banner state is eventually correct (InvokeOnUI will run), so this is a debug-logging/UX-timing issue only.

Suggested fix: Return a bool from CheckAuthStatusAsync instead of reading through the deferred property.


⚠️ New finding (low): Auto-polling recovery failure has no user feedback

When the polling loop detects auth and calls TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync(), if recovery returns false, the banner shows the old "Not authenticated" message with no indication that an auto-recovery was attempted and failed. The user is left wondering why nothing happened after running copilot login.

Suggested fix:

{
    InvokeOnUI(() =>
    {
        AuthNotice = "Authentication detected but server restart failed. Please click Re-authenticate.";
        OnStateChanged?.Invoke();
    });
}

Verdict

All three R1 blocking issues (C1/C2/C3) are correctly fixed. All moderates and minors addressed. Two new low-severity findings — neither blocks merge. ✅ Approve with the two low-severity notes above for consideration.

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🔄 Squad Re-Review — PR #446 Round 2

5-model consensus review (claude-opus-4.6 ×2, claude-sonnet-4.6 ×2, gpt-5.3-codex)

R1 Finding Status

R1 ID Finding Status
🔴 C1 StartAuthPolling() TOCTOU race FIXEDlock (_authPollLock) wraps null-check + CTS creation
🔴 C2 _authPollCts leaked after success FIXEDStopAuthPolling() called before return in polling loop
🔴 C3 AuthNotice on background thread FIXED — Events.cs write is inside existing InvokeOnUI lambda; CheckAuthStatusAsync uses InvokeOnUI for all mutations
🟡 M1 No test coverage FIXED — 5 tests added (IsAuthError string overload, GetLoginCommand, ClearAuthNotice, ReauthenticateAsync)
🟡 M2 Redundant StartAuthPolling FIXEDReauthenticateAsync delegates to CheckAuthStatusAsync which manages polling internally
🟡 M3 Silent exception catch FIXED — catch now calls StartAuthPolling() for retry
🟢 m1 Dead code in ErrorMessageHelper ✅ N/A — original finding was incorrect
🟢 m2 Throwaway Exception allocation FIXEDIsAuthError(string) overload added
🟢 m3 ClearAuthNotice no InvokeOnUI FIXED — now calls InvokeOnUI(() => OnStateChanged?.Invoke())

All three R1 blockers (C1, C2, C3) are fixed. 🎉


New Findings

🟡 M1 — ReauthenticateAsync reads stale AuthNotice after async post (4/5 models)

CopilotService.cs:314-315

CheckAuthStatusAsync sets AuthNotice via InvokeOnUISynchronizationContext.Post (queued, not synchronous). When ReauthenticateAsync awaits CheckAuthStatusAsync() then reads if (AuthNotice == null), the posted callback hasn't executed yet. On successful re-auth:

  1. CheckAuthStatusAsync posts: AuthNotice = null (queued)
  2. ReauthenticateAsync reads old AuthNotice (still set) → enters "still not authenticated" branch
  3. Posts: AuthNotice = "Server restarted but still not authenticated…"
  4. UI drains queue: first → null, then → error message
  5. User sees false failure despite successful login

Fix: Have CheckAuthStatusAsync return bool isAuthenticated and branch on that value, instead of reading the side-effected property. Alternatively, use InvokeOnUIAsync (the awaitable overload already in the codebase).

🟡 M2 — Polling recovery failure leaves dead state (3/5 models)

CopilotService.Utilities.cs:920-931

When polling detects auth, it calls StopAuthPolling() then TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync(). If recovery returns false: polling is dead, AuthNotice stays stale, no retry scheduled. User authenticated but banner still reads "Not authenticated" with no auto-recovery.

Fix: On recovery failure, either restart polling or update the banner with recovery-specific guidance (e.g., "Login succeeded but server restart failed — click Re-authenticate to retry").

🟢 Minor — ClearAuthNotice writes AuthNotice = null outside InvokeOnUI (3/5 models)

CopilotService.cs:289 — Only OnStateChanged is marshaled. Safe today (only called from UI thread), but inconsistent with the pattern in CheckAuthStatusAsync which wraps both mutation and notification.


Verdict: ⚠️ Request Changes

All R1 blockers are fixed — great work! Two new moderate findings emerged:

  1. M1 is a functional bug — successful re-authentication will show a false failure message to the user. This is the primary blocker.
  2. M2 is a UX dead-end — non-blocking but should be addressed to avoid user confusion.

After M1 is fixed, this is ready to approve.

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🔄 Re-Review Round 2 (4-Model Consensus)

Models: claude-opus-4.6 ×2, claude-sonnet-4.6, gpt-5.3-codex
Tests: ✅ 3002/3002 (4 pre-existing flaky timing tests pass in isolation)
CI: ⚠️ No checks reported on fix/surface-auth-error
New commits since R1: 1 (d4bb6ddf — "fix: address PR review — thread safety, resource leak, and test coverage")


Previous Findings Status

Finding Status Notes
🔴 C1 — StartAuthPolling() TOCTOU race FIXED lock(_authPollLock) wraps full body of both Start/StopAuthPolling
🔴 C2 — _authPollCts leaked on auth detection FIXED StopAuthPolling(); return; replaces bare break — CTS cancelled, disposed, nulled
🔴 C3 — AuthNotice written off UI thread FIXED All writes in CheckAuthStatusAsync/ReauthenticateAsync now inside InvokeOnUI; SessionErrorEvent was already inside an InvokeOnUI block in R1
🟡 M1 — No tests for auth paths ⚠️ Partially fixed 5 new tests added; ClearAuthNotice_ClearsNoticeAndStopsPolling is vacuous (notices AuthNotice was already null); polling lifecycle still uncovered
🟡 M2 — Double-start polling in ReauthenticateAsync FIXED Redundant call removed; CheckAuthStatusAsync handles it
🟡 M3 — Silent catch at startup FIXED Catch now calls StartAuthPolling() as retry
🟢 m1 — Redundant substring in ErrorMessageHelper FIXED
🟢 m2 — new Exception() allocation in Events.cs FIXED IsAuthError(string) overload added

🔴 New Blocking Finding (consensus: 4/4 models)

N1 — ReauthenticateAsync reads AuthNotice before InvokeOnUI callbacks execute

// CopilotService.cs
await CheckAuthStatusAsync();
if (AuthNotice == null)                  // ← stale read — InvokeOnUI is fire-and-forget
    _ = FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync();      // ← incorrectly called when auth still failed
else
    InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = "Server restarted but still not authenticated..."; ... });

CheckAuthStatusAsync sets AuthNotice via InvokeOnUI(), which uses SynchronizationContext.Post — fire-and-forget, not awaited. When ReauthenticateAsync reads AuthNotice on the next line, the callback has been queued but not executed.

Two concrete failure modes in production:

  1. Auth still failing, AuthNotice was null before: Post sets AuthNotice = "Not authenticated...". Stale read sees null → enters the success branch → calls FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync() on an unauthenticated session.
  2. Auth succeeded, AuthNotice was non-null: Post sets AuthNotice = null. Stale read sees the old non-null value → enters the else branch → overwrites with "Server restarted but still not authenticated..." even though auth is fine.

⚠️ The tests mask this bug: In the test environment, _syncContext is null, so InvokeOnUI runs the callback inline synchronously. The race only manifests in production on the real UI thread.

Fix: Have CheckAuthStatusAsync return bool isAuthenticated, eliminating reliance on the side-effected property:

private async Task<bool> CheckAuthStatusAsync()
{
    ...
    bool authed = status.IsAuthenticated;
    InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = authed ? null : "Not authenticated..."; OnStateChanged?.Invoke(); });
    return authed;
}

// In ReauthenticateAsync:
var isAuthenticated = await CheckAuthStatusAsync();
if (isAuthenticated)
    _ = FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync();
else
    InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = "Server restarted but still not authenticated..."; ... });

🟢 Minor (non-blocking)

# Issue Models
m1 ClearAuthNotice() sets AuthNotice = null directly (outside InvokeOnUI); consistent with UI-thread-only callers today but inconsistent with pattern elsewhere 3/4
m2 ClearAuthNotice_ClearsNoticeAndStopsPolling test is vacuous — AuthNotice is already null in demo mode, so assert passes trivially 2/4
m3 StartAuthPolling() called from InvokeOnUI callback (UI thread) acquires _authPollLock — sub-ms block point, not a deadlock, but a novel undocumented UI thread block 1/4

⚠️ Request Changes

All R1 blockers (C1/C2/C3) are cleanly resolved. One new blocker (N1) found: ReauthenticateAsync reads AuthNotice after a fire-and-forget InvokeOnUI post, which produces incorrect behavior in production while tests mask the race. Fix is straightforward — return bool from CheckAuthStatusAsync.

@PureWeen PureWeen force-pushed the fix/surface-auth-error branch from d145fb4 to a6a943d Compare March 28, 2026 19:57
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🔍 Squad Re-Review — PR #446 Round 3

New commits since Round 2 (approved):

  • a6a943da — "fix: forward GitHub token to headless server for Keychain-inaccessible auth"
  • f77d6115 — "Fix Keychain auth: add 'copilot-cli' service name for token lookup"
  • 37aadc06 — "fix: use COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN and add Keychain fallback for copilot-l…"

Tests: ✅ 2929/2929 pass (confirmed locally)


New Feature: Token Forwarding for Keychain-Inaccessible Headless Server

ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() — Token Resolution ✅

3-tier lookup: env vars (COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN) → macOS Keychain via security find-generic-passwordgh auth token CLI fallback. Each tier fails gracefully with no exception.

The Keychain lookup tries service names "copilot-cli", "github-copilot", "GitHub Copilot" — matching the memory about copilot CLI storing tokens under "copilot-cli". ✅

WaitForExit(5000) / WaitForExit(3000) timeouts: Both gh auth token and security calls use bounded waits. No hang risk. proc.WaitForExit() is called synchronously but on a background caller context — acceptable given the 3-5s upper bound. ✅

StartServerAsync(int port, string? githubToken = null) — Token Forwarding ✅

IServerManager.StartServerAsync now accepts an optional githubToken. ServerManager passes it as COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN env var to the headless server process. This is the standard env var the copilot CLI reads for auth. Interface change is backwards-compatible (optional param). ✅

_resolvedGitHubToken is cached on CopilotService and forwarded to all 6 StartServerAsync callsites (initial start, fallback restart, recovery, reinit, reconnect, RestartServerAsync). All callsites updated consistently. ✅

_resolvedGitHubToken is re-resolved in ReauthenticateAsync after copilot login completes — correct, picks up fresh token. ✅

TryReadCopilotKeychainToken() — Keychain Reading ✅

Uses security find-generic-password -s <service> -w which prints just the password. The -a (account) flag is intentionally omitted — matches first entry for the service, correct for single-account case. ✅


Observations (Non-Blocking)

🟡 Token logged to Console.WriteLine — visible in logs

Console.WriteLine("[AUTH] Resolved token from ${envVar}");
Console.WriteLine("[AUTH] Resolved token from macOS Keychain (copilot login)");
Console.WriteLine("[ServerManager] Passing COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN to headless server");

These log the fact that a token was found and forwarded — no token value is logged. However on Mac Catalyst, Console.WriteLine from background threads goes to NSLog (not console.log). In a future debugging session, these may not be visible in ~/.polypilot/console.log. Consider using Debug() instead for consistency with the rest of the service. Minor — not a security or correctness concern.

🟢 Test assertions for token resolution are lax

// We can't assert null because the test runner might have GH_TOKEN set.
Assert.True(token == null || token.Length > 0);

The test is honest about the limitation. No improvement possible without controlling the environment.


✅ Verdict: Approve

Solid follow-up fix. Token forwarding is the correct solution to the Keychain ACL problem. All StartServerAsync callsites are updated, _resolvedGitHubToken is properly cached and re-resolved on re-auth. No security concerns (no token values in logs, token forwarded only via process environment). Tests green.

🚢 Good to merge.

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🔍 Squad Review — PR #446 R3

Status: ✅ Approve
Tests: 3022/3022 pass ✅
New commits since R2: 3 commits (a6a943d, f77d611, 37aadc0)

Summary

R3 adds Keychain token resolution for macOS users who authenticated via copilot login but whose headless server can't access the Keychain due to ACL restrictions (different binary path).

New Commits Analysis

✅ Commit a6a943d — Forward GitHub token to headless server

  • Added ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() method
  • Token precedence: env vars → gh CLI (gh auth token)
  • Forwards token via GITHUB_TOKEN env var to spawned server

✅ Commit f77d611 — Add "copilot-cli" Keychain service name

  • Expanded Keychain lookup to 3 service names: copilot-cli, github-copilot, GitHub Copilot
  • Covers CLI version variations (keytar.node stores under copilot-cli)
  • Correct fix for "not created with authentication info" error

✅ Commit 37aadc0 — Use COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN (latest, best)

Token resolution order (final):

  1. Env vars: COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN > GH_TOKEN > GITHUB_TOKEN
  2. macOS Keychain: 3 service names
  3. gh CLI: gh auth token fallback

Why COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN: Highest precedence per copilot docs, won't conflict with other tools' GITHUB_TOKEN usage.

Correctness Verified

✅ Token resolution cascades through 3 layers (env → keychain → gh)
✅ Keychain lookup covers all known service name variations
COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN has correct precedence
✅ Tests all pass (3022/3022)
✅ ServerManager change is minimal (2-line fix)

Verdict

Approve — Complete auth fix addressing Keychain ACL, CLI variations, and env var precedence. Ready to merge.

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R3 Review — feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance

Tests: ✅ 3022/3022 passed (↑20 from R2's 3002)


Previous Findings Status

Finding Status
C1 (StartAuthPolling TOCTOU) ✅ Fixed (R2)
C2 (CTS leak on auth success) ✅ Fixed (R2)
C3 (AuthNotice off UI thread) ✅ Fixed (R2)
N1 (stale AuthNotice read in ReauthenticateAsync) 🔴 Still present

New Blockers (Commits 4-6)

🔴 N2 — ReadToEnd() before WaitForExit() makes timeout dead code

CopilotService.Utilities.cs — both ResolveGitHubTokenForServer and TryReadCopilotKeychainToken use:

var token = proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd().Trim();  // blocks until stdout closes
proc.WaitForExit(5000);                              // unreachable if proc hangs

ReadToEnd() blocks indefinitely until the subprocess closes its stdout. If gh auth token or security find-generic-password hangs, the calling thread is stuck forever — the WaitForExit(timeout) never fires because the thread is already parked in ReadToEnd. This runs synchronously on the init thread inside InitializeAsync, meaning a hung gh or security process freezes app startup indefinitely.

FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync in the same file correctly uses ReadToEndAsync() + WaitForExitAsync(). Same pattern should apply here.

Fix:

using var cts = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(5));
var token = await proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync(cts.Token);
await proc.WaitForExitAsync(cts.Token);

(or at minimum: WaitForExit(timeout) first, then ReadToEnd() only if HasExited)


�� N1 (carried from R2) — ReauthenticateAsync reads AuthNotice after fire-and-forget InvokeOnUI

CopilotService.csCheckAuthStatusAsync sets AuthNotice inside InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = ...; }) which is a fire-and-forget SynchronizationContext.Post. ReauthenticateAsync reads AuthNotice immediately after await CheckAuthStatusAsync():

await CheckAuthStatusAsync();
if (AuthNotice == null)  // ← stale read — InvokeOnUI callback may not have run yet
    _ = FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync();

Tests mask this because the test stub runs InvokeOnUI synchronously (no real SyncContext). In production with a UIKit/MAUI sync context, the callback is posted to the UI queue and this read races.

Recommended fix: change CheckAuthStatusAsync to return Task<bool> (true = authenticated) and use the return value instead of reading AuthNotice.


Minor Findings

🟢 N3 — ResolveGitHubTokenForServer blocks synchronously on startup

The method serially spawns up to 3 security processes (3×3s WaitForExit each, worst case) and one gh process before returning. This runs inline in InitializeAsync. Should be wrapped in Task.Run(...) or made fully async. Low probability of hitting the worst case, but worth addressing.

�� N4 — _resolvedGitHubToken not cleared in DisposeAsync

Plaintext OAuth token persists for process lifetime. DisposeAsync already calls StopAuthPolling() — adding _resolvedGitHubToken = null; is consistent with the existing cleanup pattern.

🟢 N5 — New tests are tautological

ResolveGitHubTokenForServer_ReturnsNull_WhenNoTokenAvailable asserts token == null || token.Length > 0 — always true for any string?. TryReadCopilotKeychainToken_DoesNotThrow only verifies no exception. Neither tests the critical timeout/hang behavior or fallback ordering.


Verdict: ⚠️ Request Changes

Two blockers remain:

  1. N1 — stale AuthNotice read (carried from R2, not addressed in commits 4-6)
  2. N2ReadToEnd() deadlock risk freezes app startup

The Keychain token forwarding feature (commits 4-6) is architecturally sound and addresses a real macOS ACL issue. Just needs the ReadToEnd pattern fixed to be safe.

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🔄 Squad Re-Review — PR #446 Round 3

3-model consensus review (claude-opus-4.6, claude-sonnet-4.6, gpt-5.3-codex)
New commits since R2: 3 (token forwarding, Keychain auth, COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN)

R2 Finding Status

R2 ID Finding Status
🟡 M1 ReauthenticateAsync reads stale AuthNotice STILL PRESENT — await CheckAuthStatusAsync sets AuthNotice via InvokeOnUI(Post), then line 328 reads if (AuthNotice == null) before post executes
🟡 M2 Polling recovery failure = dead state STILL PRESENT — StopAuthPolling then TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync, if false: return with no retry
🟢 m1 ClearAuthNotice bare write outside InvokeOnUI STILL PRESENT — low severity

New Findings (3 new commits)

🟡 M3 — ReadToEnd() blocks with no timeout; can freeze startup (3/3 models)

CopilotService.Utilities.cs:997,1047

Both security find-generic-password and gh auth token subprocess calls use proc.StandardOutput.ReadToEnd() — a blocking call with no timeout. WaitForExit(3000/5000) comes after ReadToEnd and provides no protection. If security triggers a macOS Keychain ACL dialog or gh hangs, the thread blocks indefinitely. This runs during InitializeAsync, potentially freezing app startup.

Fix: Wrap in Task.Run at call sites, or use async read with CancellationTokenSource timeout + proc.Kill().

🟡 M4 — WaitForExit return unchecked; zombie processes (3/3 models)

CopilotService.Utilities.cs:998,1048

WaitForExit(3000) returns bool (false = timed out) which is discarded. If it times out, the process keeps running. using var proc disposes the .NET handle but the OS process survives. With 3 service names tried, up to 3 orphaned security processes could accumulate. Also, accessing proc.ExitCode after timeout throws InvalidOperationException, caught by bare catch — potentially discarding a valid token.

Fix: Check return value; terminate on timeout.

🟡 M5 — Cached token never invalidated (3/3 models)

CopilotService.cs:85,926

_resolvedGitHubToken resolved once at init via ??=. All 7 StartServerAsync call sites reuse cached value. Not cleared in ReconnectAsync. If token is revoked during long session, every automatic restart passes stale token. Only ReauthenticateAsync (explicit) re-resolves.

Fix: Add _resolvedGitHubToken = null in ReconnectAsync.

Minor

# Finding Models
🟢 m2 Keychain -a (account) omitted — first entry wins on multi-account 2/3
🟢 m3 Token logging is safe (logs env var name, not value) ✅ 3/3

What's Good

  • ✅ Token forwarding architecture is clean — env var propagation via psi.Environment
  • ✅ Service name iteration covers all known Keychain entries
  • IServerManager.StartServerAsync signature change is backward-compatible
  • ✅ 9 new tests covering auth paths and token resolution

Verdict: ⚠️ Request Changes

R2 M1 (stale AuthNotice race) remains the primary blocker — successful re-auth shows a false failure message. M3/M4 (subprocess timeout/zombie) are new blockers from the Keychain code.

Priority fixes:

  1. R2-M1 — Return bool isAuthenticated from CheckAuthStatusAsync instead of reading AuthNotice
  2. M3/M4 — Add timeout protection + process termination for subprocess calls
  3. R2-M2 — Restart polling or update banner on recovery failure

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🔍 Re-Review — PR #446 R4

New commit since R3 (approved): d679f9a8 — "fix: address R3 review — race condition, subprocess safety, dead state recovery"


R3 Findings — All Addressed ✅

R2-M1: ReauthenticateAsync reads stale AuthNotice after InvokeOnUI

Fixed by making CheckAuthStatusAsync() return bool. ReauthenticateAsync now uses:

var isAuthenticated = await CheckAuthStatusAsync();
if (isAuthenticated) { ... }
else { ... }

No longer reads AuthNotice after the fire-and-forget InvokeOnUI post. ✅

R2-M2: Poll recovery failure leaves dead state

When TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync() fails in the poll loop, it now calls StartAuthPolling() with a user-visible message instead of silently giving up. ✅

M3/M4: Subprocess safety — ReadToEnd block / zombie processes

Extracted RunProcessWithTimeout(string fileName, string[] args, int timeoutMs) helper. Uses ReadToEndAsync + WaitForExit(timeoutMs), kills the process on timeout. Both TryReadCopilotKeychainToken and ResolveGitHubTokenForServer's gh CLI fallback now delegate to this helper. ✅

4 tests added: success, non-zero exit, missing binary, timeout. ✅

M5: _resolvedGitHubToken not cleared on reconnect

_resolvedGitHubToken = null added to ReconnectAsync (line 1185 in CopilotService.cs). Forces re-resolve on next server start, ensuring a freshly-logged-in token is picked up. ✅

R2-m1: ClearAuthNotice thread safety

AuthNotice = null inside CheckAuthStatusAsync is already wrapped in InvokeOnUI:

InvokeOnUI(() => {
    AuthNotice = null;
    OnStateChanged?.Invoke();
});


No New Issues Found

RunProcessWithTimeout uses synchronous readTask.GetAwaiter().GetResult() after WaitForExit — safe because the process has already exited, so stdout is closed and the read completes immediately. ✅

The test for timeout (sleep 30 with 100ms) will pass on macOS/Linux. On Windows this test would fail (sleep not available) but the project targets Mac Catalyst/iOS/Android. ✅


✅ Verdict: Approve

All R3 findings resolved. Tests green. Good to merge.

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🔍 Squad Re-Review — PR #446 Round 4

New commit since R3: d679f9a8 — "fix: address R3 review — race condition, subprocess safety, dead stat…"

Tests: ✅ 2928/2929 pass (1 pre-existing flaky test: ZeroIdleCaptureTests.PurgeOldCaptures_KeepsOnlyMostRecent — passes in isolation)


What Changed in d679f9a8

ClearAuthNotice() — race-safe now uses InvokeOnUI

R3 observation: ClearAuthNotice() mutated AuthNotice directly on the caller's thread. Now:

public void ClearAuthNotice()
{
    StopAuthPolling();
    InvokeOnUI(() =>
    {
        AuthNotice = null;
        OnStateChanged?.Invoke();
    });
}

AuthNotice mutation is now properly marshaled to the UI thread, consistent with StartAuthPolling / CheckAuthStatusAsync which both use InvokeOnUI for AuthNotice updates. ✅

ReconnectAsync — token cache cleared on reconnect ✅

_resolvedGitHubToken = null; // Force re-resolve on next server start

Previously _resolvedGitHubToken was cached across reconnects. After a settings change (e.g., CLI source change), the old token might be stale. Clearing it forces re-resolution. ✅

CheckAuthStatusAsync → now returns bool

private async Task CheckAuthStatusAsync()private async Task<bool> CheckAuthStatusAsync(). ReauthenticateAsync uses the return value to decide whether to log success or leave the "still not authenticated" branch to CheckAuthStatusAsync itself (which already set AuthNotice and started polling). Eliminates the prior double-setting of AuthNotice in ReauthenticateAsync. ✅

RunProcessWithTimeout — extracted static helper ✅

Both gh auth token and security find-generic-password calls are unified through RunProcessWithTimeout(fileName, args[], timeoutMs). The shared implementation:

  • Reads stdout asynchronously (ReadToEndAsync) so the read doesn't block if the process hangs
  • Calls proc.WaitForExit(timeoutMs) — if exceeded, kills the process and returns null
  • Returns null on non-zero exit or empty output

This eliminates the duplicated using var proc = Process.Start(...) / WaitForExit pattern and the previous concern about blocking synchronous reads. ✅

Test coverage for RunProcessWithTimeout:

  • ReturnsOutput_OnSuccessecho hello → "hello" ✅
  • ReturnsNull_OnNonZeroExitfalse → null ✅
  • ReturnsNull_OnMissingBinary — nonexistent binary → null ✅
  • ReturnsNull_WhenTimeoutExceededsleep 30 with 100ms timeout → null ✅

One subtle point: readTask.GetAwaiter().GetResult() is called after WaitForExit returns — the process has already exited, so the async read will complete immediately with whatever output was buffered. No deadlock risk here (the process is already done). ✅


✅ Verdict: Approve

All R3 findings addressed: ClearAuthNotice thread-safe via InvokeOnUI, token cache cleared on reconnect, CheckAuthStatusAsync return value used correctly, subprocess isolation via RunProcessWithTimeout. Well-tested. 🚢 Good to merge.

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🔍 Squad Review — PR #446 R4

Status: ✅ Approve
Tests: 3026/3026 pass ✅
New commit: d679f9a (addresses R3 feedback)

Commit d679f9a — Comprehensive Fixes

✅ R2-M1 — CheckAuthStatusAsync race condition FIXED

Before: ReauthenticateAsync read AuthNotice (stale due to InvokeOnUI race)
After: CheckAuthStatusAsync returns bool, ReauthenticateAsync uses return value

✅ R2-M2 — Polling recovery failure → dead state FIXED

Before: Polling recovery failure left auth polling stopped
After: Restarts polling on recovery failure for retry

✅ M3/M4 — Process timeout safety (NEW)

Extracted RunProcessWithTimeout helper:

  • Uses WaitForExit(timeout) check
  • Calls proc.Kill() on timeout (prevents zombies)
  • Prevents ReadToEnd block on hung processes
  • 4 new tests: success, non-zero exit, missing binary, timeout

✅ M5 — Token re-resolve on reconnect

Clears resolvedGitHubToken in ReconnectAsync to force fresh token lookup

✅ R2-m1 — ClearAuthNotice thread safety

Wraps AuthNotice=null inside InvokeOnUI() for consistency

Test Coverage

New tests (4):

  • RunProcessWithTimeout_Success
  • RunProcessWithTimeout_NonZeroExit
  • RunProcessWithTimeout_MissingBinary
  • RunProcessWithTimeout_Timeout

Total: 3026/3026 pass

Verdict

Approve — All R3 feedback addressed. Process safety improved with timeout handling. Ready to merge.

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R4 Review — feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance

Tests: ✅ 3026/3026 passed (↑4 from R3's 3022)


Previous Findings Status

Finding Status
N1 (stale AuthNotice read in ReauthenticateAsync) Fixed
N2 (ReadToEnd() deadlock on startup) Fixed
N3 (sync startup latency) 🟢 Acceptable
N4 (_resolvedGitHubToken not cleared on dispose) 🟢 Open/minor
N5 (tautological tests) Fixed — 4 real tests added

N1 Fixed

CheckAuthStatusAsync now returns Task<bool>. ReauthenticateAsync uses var isAuthenticated = await CheckAuthStatusAsync() — no longer reads AuthNotice after a fire-and-forget InvokeOnUI post. ✅

N2 Fixed

New RunProcessWithTimeout helper correctly starts ReadToEndAsync() before WaitForExit(timeout), kills the process on timeout, and only calls GetAwaiter().GetResult() after the process has confirmed exited. Both ResolveGitHubTokenForServer and TryReadCopilotKeychainToken now use it. Four new tests verify: success, non-zero exit, missing binary, and timeout with sleep 30 + 100ms window. ✅


Remaining Minor Items

🟢 One subtle note on RunProcessWithTimeout: WaitForExit(int) does not wait for EOF on redirected streams (only the no-arg overload does). So after WaitForExit(timeoutMs) returns true, the ReadToEndAsync task may briefly remain pending until stdout closes. GetAwaiter().GetResult() then blocks for that brief window. For the processes used (echo, gh auth token, security find-generic-password) this is negligible — they close stdout immediately on exit. Not a bug in practice on macOS, but worth noting if this helper is reused for longer-lived processes.

🟢 _resolvedGitHubToken not cleared in DisposeAsync (N4, carried): Plaintext token in memory for process lifetime. Low risk, minor hygiene.


Verdict: ✅ Approve

Both R3 blockers are fixed. The auth error surface (banner, polling, Re-authenticate button, RunProcessWithTimeout helper) is well-implemented and well-tested. The new RunProcessWithTimeout abstraction is clean and the timeout tests are genuinely meaningful. Good to merge.

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🔍 5-Model Consensus Review — PR #446 R4

PR: feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance
Commits: 7 (new since R3: d679f9a8 — address R3 review findings)
Models: claude-opus-4.6 ×2, claude-sonnet-4.6 ×2, gpt-5.3-codex
CI: No checks reported
Diff: +533/−18, 10 files


R3 Finding Status

Finding Status Verification
R2-M1: Stale AuthNotice race in ReauthenticateAsync ✅ FIXED Now uses var isAuthenticated = await CheckAuthStatusAsync() (returns Task<bool>), no longer reads stale AuthNotice property
R2-M2: Polling dead state ✅ FIXED StopAuthPolling() sets _authPollCts = null, allowing StartAuthPolling() to create a new poll task on recovery failure
M3: Subprocess timeout (ReadToEnd blocks) ✅ FIXED New RunProcessWithTimeout uses WaitForExit(timeoutMs) with async stdout read
M4: Zombie processes ✅ FIXED proc.Kill() called on timeout; using var proc ensures disposal
M5: Cached _resolvedGitHubToken not cleared ✅ FIXED _resolvedGitHubToken = null in ReconnectAsync (L1185) forces re-resolution

All 5 prior findings are resolved.


New Consensus Findings

🟡 M1 — RunProcessWithTimeout redirects stderr but never drains it (3/5 models)

CopilotService.Utilities.cs:~570RedirectStandardError = true is set, but stderr is never read. If a child process writes enough to stderr to fill the OS pipe buffer (~64KB), the process blocks and WaitForExit(timeoutMs) burns the full timeout before killing it.

Current impact: Low — security find-generic-password, gh auth token, and echo produce minimal stderr. But 3× keychain lookups with 3s timeouts = worst-case 9s delay on cold start if stderr fills.

Fix (one-liner): Either RedirectStandardError = false (simplest — the output is unused) or add _ = proc.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync() concurrently.

🟢 m1 — Test coverage gaps (2/5 models)

  • No test for auth polling success path (TryRecoverPersistentServerAsyncCheckAuthStatusAsync → banner clears)
  • No test for stderr-heavy process in RunProcessWithTimeout
  • IsAuthError string overload tests cover 5 of 13 auth patterns

Token Security Audit ✅

Verified by 5/5 models: _resolvedGitHubToken is never logged by value. All Console.WriteLine calls log the token source ("from $envVar", "from Keychain", etc.) but not the token content. No serialization or debug output exposes the value. Clean.


Architecture Assessment

The CheckAuthStatusAsync → StartAuthPolling → TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync lifecycle is well-designed:

  • Polling has proper lock-based dedup (_authPollLock)
  • CTS disposal is correct (local cts captured, return after recovery prevents stale access)
  • DisposeAsync calls StopAuthPolling() (no resource leak)
  • ReconnectAsync clears auth state (AuthNotice = null, token = null, polling stopped)
  • RunProcessWithTimeout is a solid reusable utility (tested with 4 test cases)

Verdict: ✅ Approve

All R3 findings are fixed. The stderr redirect (M1) is a minor robustness improvement worth addressing but not a merge blocker. The auth error surfacing feature is well-tested (15 new tests), properly handles the full lifecycle, and adds clear user-facing value.

PureWeen and others added 7 commits March 29, 2026 16:36
- Check auth status via SDK GetAuthStatusAsync after initialization
- Show dismissible 🔑 banner when CLI server is not authenticated
- Humanize 'not created with authentication info' error to tell users
  to run 'copilot login' then reconnect
- Add error pattern to IsAuthError() for proper classification
- Clear auth notice on reconnect

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
…to-polling

- Replace 'Reconnect' with 'Re-authenticate' that force-restarts the
  headless server via TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync() to pick up
  fresh credentials (running server caches stale tokens in memory)
- Add 'Copy Command' button showing the resolved copilot login path
- Add background auth polling (10s interval) that auto-detects when
  user completes 'copilot login' and triggers server restart + clears banner
- Wire SessionErrorEvent to set AuthNotice reactively for mid-session
  auth failures
- Re-verify auth after server restart; update banner if still failing
- Clean up polling on dismiss, reconnect, and dispose

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
C1: Add _authPollLock to prevent TOCTOU race in StartAuthPolling/
    StopAuthPolling (lock wraps both methods)
C2: Call StopAuthPolling() before returning from polling success path
    to prevent CTS leak and permanent guard stuck
C3: Wrap all AuthNotice mutations in InvokeOnUI() to match service
    convention (CheckAuthStatusAsync, ReauthenticateAsync)
M1: Add 11 tests — IsAuthError string overload, GetLoginCommand
    fallback, ClearAuthNotice cleanup, ReauthenticateAsync failure
M2: Remove redundant StartAuthPolling() in ReauthenticateAsync
    (CheckAuthStatusAsync already starts it if needed)
M3: Treat thrown exception in CheckAuthStatusAsync as possibly
    unauthenticated — start polling for retry instead of silently
    swallowing
m1: Remove dead code substring check in ErrorMessageHelper
m2: Add IsAuthError(string) overload to avoid throwaway Exception
    allocation in SessionErrorEvent handler
m3: ClearAuthNotice() now calls InvokeOnUI(OnStateChanged)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
…e environments

Root cause: when copilot login stores credentials in macOS Keychain,
the headless server spawned by PolyPilot may not have Keychain access
(ACL dialog can't be shown for background processes). The server starts
without auth, causing 'session was not created with authentication info'.

Fix: ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() checks COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN,
GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN env vars, then falls back to 'gh auth token'
CLI. The resolved token is passed to StartServerAsync() which sets
GITHUB_TOKEN on the headless server process environment.

- Add githubToken parameter to IServerManager.StartServerAsync
- Resolve token once at init, cache in _resolvedGitHubToken
- Re-resolve on ReauthenticateAsync (user may have just logged in)
- Forward to all 7 StartServerAsync call sites
- Add 3 tests for token resolution and parameter forwarding

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
The copilot CLI stores its OAuth token in macOS Keychain under service
name "copilot-cli" (via keytar.node), not "github-copilot" or
"GitHub Copilot" as previously assumed. Users who completed
`copilot login` but do not have `gh` CLI would get "Session was not
created with authentication info" because the Keychain lookup missed
the correct service name.

Add "copilot-cli" as the first (most common) service name to try in
TryReadCopilotKeychainToken(). Keep the other names as fallbacks for
older CLI versions.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
…ogin-only users

The copilot CLI stores its OAuth token in macOS Keychain under service
name 'copilot-cli' (via keytar.node). The headless server spawned by
PolyPilot may not inherit the Keychain ACL (different binary path than
the terminal copilot), causing 'not created with authentication info'.

Token resolution order (ResolveGitHubTokenForServer):
  1. Env vars: COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN > GH_TOKEN > GITHUB_TOKEN
  2. macOS Keychain: service names 'copilot-cli', 'github-copilot',
     'GitHub Copilot' (covers CLI version variations)
  3. gh CLI: 'gh auth token' fallback

Use COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN (not GITHUB_TOKEN) when forwarding to the
headless server — it has highest precedence per copilot docs and
won't conflict with other tools' env vars.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
…e recovery

- R2-M1: CheckAuthStatusAsync returns bool; ReauthenticateAsync uses
  return value instead of reading stale AuthNotice (InvokeOnUI race)
- R2-M2: Polling recovery failure restarts polling instead of dead state
- M3/M4: Extract RunProcessWithTimeout helper with WaitForExit check
  and proc.Kill on timeout — prevents zombies and ReadToEnd blocks
- M5: Clear resolvedGitHubToken in ReconnectAsync to force re-resolve
- R2-m1: ClearAuthNotice wraps AuthNotice=null inside InvokeOnUI
- Add 4 tests for RunProcessWithTimeout (success, non-zero exit,
  missing binary, timeout)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
@PureWeen PureWeen force-pushed the fix/surface-auth-error branch from d679f9a to 32d8e0b Compare March 29, 2026 21:36
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🔍 PR Review — #446 Round 5 (2-Model Consensus)

Models: gpt-5.3-codex, claude-opus-4.6 (manual analysis — sub-agents stuck)
Tests: ✅ 54/54 ServerRecoveryTests pass
CI: ⚠️ No checks reported on fix/surface-auth-error branch


Corrections to GPT Finding

GPT flagged 🔴 "polling task has no try/catch — _authPollCts stays non-null". This is incorrect. The while loop body at CopilotService.Utilities.cs:903-941 IS wrapped in try/catch — OperationCanceledException breaks the loop, other exceptions are caught and logged. The _authPollCts is properly cleaned up via StopAuthPolling().

Additionally, GPT flagged thread safety on AuthNotice in Events.cs:799. Also incorrect — that assignment is inside the InvokeOnUI() callback at line 792. All AuthNotice writes are properly marshaled.


Consensus Findings (2+ models agree)

🟢 MINOR — RunProcessWithTimeout handle lifecycle

File: CopilotService.Utilities.cs:1051-1055
Models: gpt-5.3-codex, manual analysis
Issue: After proc.Kill() on timeout, readTask (from ReadToEndAsync) is not awaited before returning. The using block disposes the Process, closing the stdout pipe, which should cause readTask to complete. However, there is a brief window where the task is orphaned.
Impact: Minimal in practice — the using ensures cleanup, and killed processes terminate immediately. No actual handle leak due to Dispose.

🟢 MINOR — Auth polling task not awaited in DisposeAsync

File: CopilotService.cs:4707 / CopilotService.Utilities.cs:898
Models: gpt-5.3-codex, manual analysis
Issue: DisposeAsync calls StopAuthPolling() which cancels the CTS, but the background Task.Run polling task is fire-and-forget — it is not awaited. If the task is mid-TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync(), it could complete after disposal.
Impact: Low — this is a common pattern in the codebase (other fire-and-forget tasks like FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync use the same pattern). The cancellation token causes quick exit in the normal path.

🟢 MINOR — Platform-specific test utilities

File: ServerRecoveryTests.cs:214-242
Models: gpt-5.3-codex, manual analysis
Issue: RunProcessWithTimeout tests depend on Unix binaries (echo, sleep, false). These would fail on Windows CI.
Impact: Low — the project targets Mac Catalyst/iOS/Android. No Windows CI pipeline exists. But worth noting if CI is added later.


Thread Safety Verification ✅

All AuthNotice writes were verified to be on UI thread:

  • Events.cs:799 — inside InvokeOnUI() callback (line 792) ✅
  • CopilotService.cs:305 — inside InvokeOnUI() callback ✅
  • CopilotService.cs:346 — inside InvokeOnUI() callback ✅
  • CopilotService.cs:1190 — in ReconnectAsync() (UI-thread caller) ✅
  • Utilities.cs:859,869 — inside InvokeOnUI() callbacks ✅
  • Utilities.cs:919,929 — inside InvokeOnUI() callbacks ✅

_resolvedGitHubToken is written from multiple threads without synchronization, but string reference assignments are atomic in .NET. Stale reads are acceptable for this use case.

Token Security ✅

Console.WriteLine logs only token SOURCE (e.g., $GH_TOKEN, macOS Keychain) — never actual token values.

Test Coverage ✅

New code paths are well-covered: 20 new tests covering IsAuthError(string), GetLoginCommand, ClearAuthNotice, ReauthenticateAsync, ResolveGitHubTokenForServer, TryReadCopilotKeychainToken, RunProcessWithTimeout, and StubServerManager token forwarding.


Summary

This PR has been through 4 prior review rounds and all findings were addressed. The current round found only MINOR items (none requiring changes). The code is well-structured with proper thread safety, error handling, and test coverage.

Recommended action: ✅ Approve

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🔍 3-Model Consensus Review — PR #446 (Worker-2)

PR: feat: surface auth errors with actionable guidance
Models: claude-opus-4.6, claude-sonnet-4.6, gpt-5.3-codex
CI: No checks reported
Diff: +579/−17, 10 files
Prior reviews: R4 review approved with 2 minor findings (stderr redirect, test coverage gaps)


Adversarial Consensus Process

Each model independently reviewed the full diff. Findings flagged by only 1 model were shared with the other 2 for agree/disagree. Only findings with 2+ model agreement are included below.

Discarded findings (1-model only, rebutted):

  • stdout ReadToEndAsync + WaitForExit deadlock (Opus only; Sonnet correctly noted this follows the MS-documented pattern for async reads)
  • StartAuthPolling inside InvokeOnUI deadlock (Opus only; GPT+Sonnet noted Post() is async dispatch, no wait cycle)
  • Console.WriteLine instead of Debug (Sonnet only)
  • Broad-scope PAT concern (Opus only)

Consensus Findings

🟡 F1 — UI thread frozen for up to 14s on Re-authenticate click (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.csReauthenticateAsync(), line ~326
What: ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() is called synchronously before the first await. Since the Blazor @onclick handler directly awaits this method, all synchronous work runs on the UI dispatcher thread. ResolveGitHubTokenForServer spawns up to 4 child processes sequentially (3× security find-generic-password at 3s timeout each + 1× gh auth token at 5s) = worst-case 14s of UI freeze. The "Restarting…" button text won't even render because StateHasChanged() can't execute while the thread is blocked.
Fix: _resolvedGitHubToken = await Task.Run(() => ResolveGitHubTokenForServer());

🟡 F2 — RunProcessWithTimeout redirects stderr but never drains it (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.Utilities.csRunProcessWithTimeout(), line ~1039
What: RedirectStandardError = true is set but stderr is never read. If a child process writes enough to stderr to fill the OS pipe buffer (~4–64KB), the process blocks on its stderr write. WaitForExit(timeoutMs) burns the full timeout before killing.
Current impact: Low — security -w, gh auth token, and echo produce minimal stderr. But 3× keychain lookups with 3s timeouts = worst-case 9s delay if stderr fills.
Fix (one-liner): Either RedirectStandardError = false (simplest — output is unused) or add _ = proc.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync() concurrently.

Note: This was also flagged in R4 review as M1.

🟡 F3 — AuthNotice written on wrong thread in Events.cs (2/3 models: Opus+Sonnet agree, GPT disagrees)

File: CopilotService.Events.cs, line ~799
What: The new code block:

AuthNotice = "Not authenticated — ...";
StartAuthPolling();

runs on the SDK callback thread (background), not inside InvokeOnUI(). Compare with CheckAuthStatusAsync() in the same PR which correctly uses InvokeOnUI(() => { AuthNotice = ...; OnStateChanged?.Invoke(); }). This path is also missing the OnStateChanged?.Invoke() call, so the banner won't render until something else triggers a render cycle.
Fix: Wrap in InvokeOnUI and add OnStateChanged?.Invoke().

🟡 F4 — Tests use Unix-only commands (false, sleep) (3/3 models)

File: ServerRecoveryTests.cs, lines ~214, 222, 238
What: RunProcessWithTimeout_ReturnsNull_OnNonZeroExit uses "false" and RunProcessWithTimeout_ReturnsNull_WhenTimeoutExceeded uses "sleep 30" — neither exists as standalone binaries on Windows. Both pass via the catch block (binary not found), but they test the missing-binary path instead of the non-zero-exit and timeout paths they claim to test. False confidence on Windows CI.
Fix: Use cross-platform alternatives, e.g., dotnet --version for success, or conditional [SkipOnWindows] attributes with Windows-specific equivalents.

🟡 F5 — Polling lifecycle race: dismiss silently fails (2/3 models: Opus+Sonnet)

File: CopilotService.Utilities.csStartAuthPolling() / StopAuthPolling()
What: When the polling task detects auth success: (1) calls StopAuthPolling() (sets _authPollCts = null), (2) attempts recovery, (3) on failure calls StartAuthPolling() again. If the user clicks Dismiss between steps 1 and 3, ClearAuthNotice()StopAuthPolling() is a no-op (CTS already null). Step 3 then starts a new polling loop — the dismiss action silently fails. Related: repeated recovery failures accumulate background Task objects.
Impact: Low in practice (requires specific timing), but worth a defensive fix.

🟢 F6 — GetLoginCommand returns unquoted CLI path (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.csGetLoginCommand(), line ~314
What: $"{cliPath} login" — if cliPath contains spaces (e.g., macOS bundle paths), the copied command fails in terminal.
Fix: $"\"{cliPath}\" login" or shell-appropriate quoting.

🟢 F7 — _resolvedGitHubToken not thread-safe (2/3 models: Opus+Sonnet)

File: CopilotService.cs
What: Written from UI thread, background polling task, and InitializeAsync without volatile or locking. Reference assignments are atomic in .NET (no torn reads), but there's no visibility guarantee across threads without a memory barrier. The async/await points provide implicit barriers in practice.
Impact: Theoretical — unlikely to cause issues given async/await usage.


Token Security Audit ✅

Verified by all 3 models: _resolvedGitHubToken is never logged by value. All Console.WriteLine calls log the token source ("from $envVar", "from Keychain", etc.) but not the token content. No serialization or debug output exposes the value.


Test Coverage Assessment

15 new tests cover: IsAuthError string overload (5 positive + 3 negative), GetLoginCommand, ClearAuthNotice, ReauthenticateAsync, ResolveGitHubTokenForServer, TryReadCopilotKeychainToken, ServerManager token parameter, RunProcessWithTimeout (4 cases). Good coverage for the new utility methods. Notable gaps (not blocking): no test for the full auth polling success→recovery path, and Windows-specific test variants.


Architecture Assessment

The CheckAuthStatusAsync → StartAuthPolling → TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync lifecycle is well-designed overall:

  • Polling has lock-based dedup (_authPollLock)
  • CTS disposal is correct (local cts captured, return after recovery)
  • DisposeAsync calls StopAuthPolling() (no resource leak)
  • ReconnectAsync properly clears all auth state
  • RunProcessWithTimeout is a solid reusable utility with process kill on timeout

Verdict: ⚠️ Request Changes

The feature is well-implemented and adds clear user value. However, F1 (UI freeze) and F3 (wrong-thread write) are real bugs that affect the user experience and should be fixed before merge. F2 (stderr) is a robustness improvement worth including. The remaining findings are minor.

Specific asks:

  1. Wrap ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() in Task.Run in ReauthenticateAsync (F1)
  2. Wrap the AuthNotice assignment in Events.cs inside InvokeOnUI with OnStateChanged (F3)
  3. Set RedirectStandardError = false in RunProcessWithTimeout (F2)

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🔍 PR Review — #446 Round 6 (3-Model Consensus)

Models: claude-opus-4.6, claude-sonnet-4.6, gpt-5.3-codex
Tests: ✅ 54/54 ServerRecoveryTests pass
CI: ⚠️ No checks reported on fix/surface-auth-error branch
Prior reviews: 15 comments across Rounds 1-5 (all approved; all prior findings addressed)


Consensus Findings (2+ of 3 models agree)

🟡 MODERATE — RunProcessWithTimeout: abandoned readTask after Kill() (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.Utilities.cs:1051-1055
Models: opus ✅, sonnet ✅, gpt ✅
Issue: On timeout, proc.Kill() is called then the method returns null. The using block disposes the Process, closing StandardOutput out from under the still-running ReadToEndAsync() task. This produces an unobserved ObjectDisposedException on the finalizer thread.
Impact: Unobserved task exception noise in TaskScheduler.UnobservedTaskException. The StreamReader handle may not be released until GC. In practice, the using ensures process cleanup, so no permanent leak — but the orphaned task is not clean.
Fix: After Kill(), do try { readTask.GetAwaiter().GetResult(); } catch { } before returning, or call proc.WaitForExit() (no timeout) after Kill to ensure the pipe drains.

🟢 MINOR — AuthNotice = null in ReconnectAsync without InvokeOnUI (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.cs:1190
Models: opus ✅, sonnet ✅, gpt ✅
Issue: All 7 other AuthNotice write sites correctly use InvokeOnUI(). This one is a bare assignment, following the pre-existing FallbackNotice = null pattern. While ReconnectAsync is currently only called from UI-thread contexts (Settings page, tests), this violates the stated threading invariant.
Impact: Low probability today, but one refactor away from a race with the polling loop writing AuthNotice from a background thread. Wrap in InvokeOnUI() for consistency.

🟢 MINOR — DisposeAsync does not await auth polling background task (2/3 models)

File: CopilotService.cs:4707 / CopilotService.Utilities.cs:898
Models: opus ✅, sonnet ✅
Issue: StopAuthPolling() cancels the CTS but the fire-and-forget Task.Run is not stored or awaited. The polling loop could still be mid-TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync() when disposal continues.
Impact: Low — the polling loop's try/catch absorbs exceptions. Follows the same pattern as other fire-and-forget tasks in this codebase (FetchGitHubUserInfoAsync, etc.). Storing and awaiting the polling Task would be cleaner but is not a blocker.


False Positives Rejected

Claim Verdict Why
AuthNotice set without InvokeOnUI in Events.cs:799 ❌ False positive Line 799 IS inside the InvokeOnUI() callback started at line 792 — verified by reading actual source
_resolvedGitHubToken needs volatile ❌ Not consensus Only 1/3 flagged; Opus explicitly rejected — reference assignment is atomic in .NET
CTS use-after-dispose in polling loop ❌ Not consensus Only 1/3 flagged; .Token no longer throws post-dispose since .NET 6
Auth polling not mode-gated ❌ Not consensus Only 1/3 flagged; CheckAuthStatusAsync returns early for Demo/Remote modes
Stderr pipe deadlock in RunProcessWithTimeout ❌ Not consensus Only 1/3 flagged; security and gh do not produce 64KB+ stderr in practice

Thread Safety Verification ✅

All AuthNotice write sites verified:

Location Thread Method
Events.cs:799 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI at line 792) HandleSessionEvent error handler
CopilotService.cs:305 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI) ClearAuthNotice
CopilotService.cs:346 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI) ReauthenticateAsync failure
CopilotService.cs:1190 ⚠️ Bare assignment (currently UI caller) ReconnectAsync
Utilities.cs:859 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI) CheckAuthStatusAsync success
Utilities.cs:869 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI) CheckAuthStatusAsync failure
Utilities.cs:919 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI) StartAuthPolling success
Utilities.cs:929 ✅ UI (InvokeOnUI) StartAuthPolling failure

Token Security ✅

Console.WriteLine logs only token SOURCE names ($GH_TOKEN, macOS Keychain, etc.) — never actual token values.

Test Coverage ✅

20 new tests cover: IsAuthError(string), GetLoginCommand, ClearAuthNotice, ReauthenticateAsync, ResolveGitHubTokenForServer, TryReadCopilotKeychainToken, RunProcessWithTimeout (4 cases), and StubServerManager token forwarding.


Summary

Severity Count Consensus
🔴 CRITICAL 0
🟡 MODERATE 1 RunProcessWithTimeout abandoned readTask
🟢 MINOR 2 ReconnectAsync bare assignment, unawaited dispose

This PR has been through 5 prior rounds with all findings addressed. Round 6 found 1 moderate and 2 minor items. The moderate item (orphaned readTask) is low-risk in practice (timeout kills process, using-block cleans up) but would be cleaner to fix.

Recommended action: ✅ Approve — no blocking issues. The moderate readTask cleanup is nice-to-have but not a regression risk.

- F1: Wrap ResolveGitHubTokenForServer in Task.Run to avoid blocking
  the UI thread for up to 14s during Re-authenticate
- F2: Set RedirectStandardError=false in RunProcessWithTimeout since
  stderr is unused — prevents pipe buffer deadlock
- F6: Quote CLI path in GetLoginCommand for paths with spaces

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Addressing R5 Findings

Commit 8801c701 fixes F1, F2, and F6.

✅ F1 — UI freeze during Re-authenticate

ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() now wrapped in Task.Run() so subprocess I/O runs off the UI thread.

✅ F2 — stderr pipe buffer deadlock

RedirectStandardError set to false in RunProcessWithTimeout — stderr output is unused.

✅ F6 — Unquoted CLI path

GetLoginCommand() now returns "\"{cliPath}\" login" so paths with spaces work.

❌ F3 — AuthNotice written on wrong thread: Incorrect finding

The reviewers stated that AuthNotice at Events.cs:799 runs on a background SDK thread outside InvokeOnUI(). This is wrong — the assignment is inside the InvokeOnUI() callback that opens at line 792:

InvokeOnUI(() =>           // ← line 792
{
    if (state.IsOrphaned) return;
    OnError?.Invoke(sessionName, errMsg);
    if (IsAuthError(err.Data?.Message ?? ""))
    {
        AuthNotice = "...";   // ← line 799, INSIDE the callback
        StartAuthPolling();
    }
    ...
    OnStateChanged?.Invoke(); // ← line 825, also inside
});                           // ← line 826, closes the callback

Both the AuthNotice write and OnStateChanged are on the UI thread. No fix needed.

Remaining findings (F4, F5, F7) are minor/accepted — no action needed.

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🔍 PR Review — #446 Round 7 (3-Model Consensus)

Models: claude-opus-4.6, claude-sonnet-4.6, gpt-5.3-codex
Tests: ✅ 54/54 ServerRecoveryTests pass
CI: ⚠️ No checks reported on fix/surface-auth-error branch
New commit: 8801c701 — "fix: address R5 review — UI freeze, stderr pipe, unquoted path"


R6 Fixes Confirmed ✅

R6 Finding Fix in 8801c70
Stderr pipe buffer deadlock RedirectStandardError = false
UI freeze in ReauthenticateAsync await Task.Run(() => ResolveGitHubTokenForServer())
Unquoted CLI path with spaces $"\"{cliPath}\" login"

NEW Consensus Finding

🟡 MODERATE — ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() still blocks UI thread in InitializeAsync (2/3 models)

File: CopilotService.cs:932
Models: opus ✅, sonnet ✅
Issue: _resolvedGitHubToken ??= ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() is a synchronous call that spawns up to 4 child processes (3x security @3s + gh auth token @5S = 14s worst case). The fix in commit 8801c70 correctly wrapped the same call in ReauthenticateAsync (line 327) with await Task.Run(...), but missed the InitializeAsync call site. Since InitializeAsync runs on the UI thread at app startup, this freezes the UI during cold start in Persistent mode when no token is cached.
Fix: _resolvedGitHubToken ??= await Task.Run(() => ResolveGitHubTokenForServer());


Carried-Forward Findings (unchanged from R6)

🟡 MODERATE — RunProcessWithTimeout readTask abandoned on timeout (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.Utilities.cs:587-590
Models: opus ✅, sonnet ✅, gpt ✅
Issue: On timeout, proc.Kill() is called and the method returns without awaiting readTask. The using block disposes the process, producing an unobserved ObjectDisposedException.
Impact: Low in practice — swallowed by .NET Core default. Noisy in diagnostics.

🟢 MINOR — AuthNotice = null bare assignment in ReconnectAsync (3/3 models)

File: CopilotService.cs:1191
Models: opus ✅, sonnet ✅, gpt ✅
Issue: Same as R6. Currently safe (UI-thread caller), inconsistent with ClearAuthNotice().

🟢 MINOR — DisposeAsync does not await polling task (2/3 models)

File: CopilotService.cs:4708
Models: opus ✅, gpt ✅
Issue: Same as R6. Polling task fire-and-forget. Standard pattern in this codebase.


False Positive Rejected

Claim Model Verdict Why
AuthNotice set from BG thread in Events.cs:799 sonnet ❌ False positive Line 799 IS inside InvokeOnUI() callback started at line 792 — verified by grep

Summary

Severity Count Key concern
🔴 CRITICAL 0
🟡 MODERATE 2 InitializeAsync UI freeze (NEW), readTask leak (carried)
🟢 MINOR 2 ReconnectAsync bare write, unawaited dispose (carried)

The new commit fixed 3 of 3 targeted issues from R6. It introduced 1 new moderate finding: the ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() call was wrapped in Task.Run in ReauthenticateAsync but not in InitializeAsync. This is a one-line fix.

Recommended action: ⚠️ Request changes — wrap InitializeAsync:932 in Task.Run to match ReauthenticateAsync:327. The readTask leak is nice-to-have but not blocking.

- Wrap ResolveGitHubTokenForServer in Task.Run in InitializeAsync
  (matches ReauthenticateAsync fix from R5)
- Drain abandoned readTask after proc.Kill in RunProcessWithTimeout
  to avoid unobserved ObjectDisposedException on finalizer thread

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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R8 Consensus Review — commit 463d63bd

Reviewers: Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.3-Codex
Tests: 54/54 ServerRecoveryTests pass ✅
CI: No automated checks configured ⚠️

R7 Findings — Status

# Finding Status
1 🟡 InitializeAsync:932ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() blocks UI thread up to 14s Fixed — wrapped in await Task.Run(...)
2 🟡 RunProcessWithTimeout — abandoned readTask after Kill() leaks unobserved exception Fixed — drained with try { readTask.GetAwaiter().GetResult(); } catch { }
3 🟢 Bare AuthNotice = null in ReconnectAsync (no InvokeOnUI) Acknowledged — follows pre-existing codebase pattern
4 🟢 DisposeAsync doesn't await polling task Acknowledged — follows codebase pattern

Fix Verification

Fix 1 — InitializeAsync UI freeze (3/3 models confirm correct):
_resolvedGitHubToken ??= await Task.Run(() => ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()) correctly offloads up to 14s of blocking I/O (3× keychain + gh CLI) off the UI thread. The ??= guard prevents redundant re-resolution.

Fix 2 — readTask drain (3/3 models confirm correct):
After proc.Kill(), the pipe closes and ReadToEndAsync receives EOF. The synchronous GetAwaiter().GetResult() completes promptly. The catch {} correctly swallows expected ObjectDisposedException. GPT raised a concern about descendant processes keeping the pipe open (1/3), but Opus and Sonnet both confirmed Kill() closes the stdout fd, so ReadToEndAsync completes. Does not meet 2/3 consensus threshold.

New Issues — None (consensus)

No finding reached the 2/3 model consensus threshold. Sonnet flagged Events.cs AuthNotice assignment as bare/un-marshaled (4th consecutive round) — verified again that line 799 IS inside InvokeOnUI() at line 792. False positive.

Verdict: ✅ Approve

Both R7 findings fixed correctly. No new regressions. 54/54 tests pass. Ship it.

@PureWeen PureWeen merged commit b89b2ff into main Mar 30, 2026
@PureWeen PureWeen deleted the fix/surface-auth-error branch March 30, 2026 01:22
PureWeen added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2026
Root cause: ResolveGitHubTokenForServer() reads macOS Keychain via
`security find-generic-password -w`, which triggers a password dialog.
This was called preemptively at startup (InitializeAsync) and on every
auth polling cycle (every 10s when auth fails). Combined with static
token expiration (~1h), this created recurring password prompts.

Changes:
- Split ResolveGitHubTokenForServer into ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv
  (safe, no prompt) and full version (with Keychain, may prompt)
- InitializeAsync: only check env vars at startup, no Keychain read
- CheckAuthStatusAsync: on first auth failure, lazily resolve full
  token chain (including Keychain) and auto-restart server with it
- Auth polling loop: use cached token only, never re-read Keychain
  (was calling ResolveGitHubTokenForServer on every detection cycle)
- ReauthenticateAsync: unchanged — explicit user action, prompt OK
- Add auth-token-safety skill with 9 invariants from PR #446

This ensures:
- Users whose server self-authenticates: zero password prompts
- Users with Keychain ACL issue: one prompt on first failure, cached
- No hourly re-prompting from polling or token expiration cycles

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
PureWeen added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 30, 2026
## Problem

After PR #446 merged, a user reported: **"PP now restarts every hour or
so, and asks for my login password to authenticate to copilot-cli"**

## Root Cause Analysis

Three interacting bugs create a recurring password prompt cycle:

### Bug 1: Preemptive Keychain read at startup
`InitializeAsync` (line 932) called `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()`
unconditionally in Persistent mode. This runs `security
find-generic-password -s "copilot-cli" -w`, which triggers a **macOS
Keychain ACL password dialog** because PolyPilot is not in the ACL for
the `copilot-cli` entry (only the terminal `copilot` binary that created
it is). Every user saw this dialog on every app launch — even users
whose server could self-authenticate fine.

### Bug 2: Polling loop re-reads Keychain every 10 seconds
The auth polling loop at `Utilities.cs:916` called
`ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` whenever it detected auth went from
false → true. Since polling runs every 10s, this means:
- If the Keychain dialog **times out** (3s `RunProcessWithTimeout`),
token comes back `null` → server starts without auth → polling detects
no auth → **another dialog in 10 seconds** (tight loop)
- If the user clicks Allow, the token is static and will expire

### Bug 3: Static token expiration creates hourly cycle
The `gho_*` OAuth token forwarded as `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN` env var is a
**static snapshot**. The copilot CLI normally refreshes tokens via
keytar.node, but an env var bypasses that refresh mechanism. When the
token expires (~1h, aligned with `WatchdogMaxProcessingTimeSeconds =
3600`):
1. All sessions fail → watchdog fires after 2 consecutive timeouts
2. `TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync` restarts server with same stale
cached token
3. Server still unauthenticated → `CheckAuthStatusAsync` starts polling
4. Polling detects auth → calls `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` →
**Keychain dialog again**

Additionally, the `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` call in the polling
loop was the **one call site not wrapped in `Task.Run`** (the R5/R7
fixes covered `InitializeAsync` and `ReauthenticateAsync` but missed
this third site).

## Design Decisions

### Why not just remove Keychain reads entirely?
**Because it would regress the original PR #446 fix.** The original
issue was users getting "Session was not created with authentication
info or custom provider" because the headless server binary cannot
access the Keychain (macOS ACL restriction — different binary path). If
we remove Keychain reads, those users have no way to authenticate —
`copilot login` writes to Keychain under the terminal binary's ACL, so
the headless server still can't read it. The Keychain read is the **only
fix** for users without `gh` CLI or env vars set.

### Why split into `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv` vs
`ResolveGitHubTokenForServer`?
To make the safety boundary explicit in the API:
- `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv()` — **always safe**, no subprocess, no
prompt, instant. Used at startup.
- `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` — **dangerous**, may trigger Keychain
dialog. Only called on explicit user action or after confirmed auth
failure.

The doc comments on `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer` now include a ⚠️
warning and reference the skill invariants (INV-A1, INV-A2) to prevent
future agents from calling it preemptively.

### Why lazy resolution in `CheckAuthStatusAsync` instead of just
showing the banner?
For users whose server genuinely can't self-authenticate (the original
PR #446 users), showing a banner and telling them to run `copilot login`
doesn't help — they've already done that. The Keychain entry exists; the
server just can't read it. Lazy resolution means:
1. Server starts without token (no prompt)
2. `CheckAuthStatusAsync` detects auth failure
3. **First time only** (`_resolvedGitHubToken == null`): resolves full
chain including Keychain → one password dialog → caches token → restarts
server
4. If the restart works → user is authenticated with zero manual
intervention after the one dialog
5. On subsequent failures (token expiry): uses cached token, **no new
dialog**

### Why does the polling loop no longer re-resolve?
The polling loop runs every 10 seconds. Re-reading the Keychain on every
cycle means a password dialog every 10 seconds if the user doesn't
respond. Instead, the polling loop now uses `_resolvedGitHubToken`
(already cached from the lazy resolution or from `ReauthenticateAsync`).
Only the explicit "Re-authenticate" button triggers a fresh Keychain
read — that's an intentional user action where a password prompt is
expected.

## Changes

| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | Split `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer`
into env-only (`ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv`) and full version |
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | `CheckAuthStatusAsync`: lazy
full-chain resolve on first auth failure, auto-restart with token |
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | Polling loop: use cached token only,
removed `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` call |
| `CopilotService.cs` | `InitializeAsync`: use
`ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv()` (no Keychain, no prompt) |
| `ServerRecoveryTests.cs` | Add test for `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv` |
| `.claude/skills/auth-token-safety/SKILL.md` | New skill: 9 invariants
from PR #446 regression analysis |

## Behavior Matrix

| User type | Before (PR #446) | After (this PR) |
|-----------|------------------|-----------------|
| Server self-authenticates | ❌ Password dialog at every startup | ✅
Zero prompts |
| Keychain ACL issue, first launch | ❌ Password dialog at startup | ✅
One dialog after auth failure detected |
| Keychain ACL issue, token expires | ❌ Password dialog every hour | ✅
No dialog (uses cached token) |
| Keychain dialog timeout (3s) | ❌ Dialog every 10s (tight loop) | ✅ No
loop (polling uses cache) |
| User clicks Re-authenticate | ✅ Fresh Keychain read | ✅ Fresh Keychain
read (unchanged) |
| Has GH_TOKEN env var | ✅ No dialog | ✅ No dialog (env-only at startup)
|

## Tests
- 3059/3059 pass ✅
- New test: `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv_ReturnsNull_WhenNoEnvVarsSet`

## Related
- Fixes regression from #446
- Adds `.claude/skills/auth-token-safety/SKILL.md` with 9 invariants to
prevent future regressions

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
PureWeen added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2026
## Problem

Every couple of hours, the user gets prompted to "allow copilot-cli" and
must enter their macOS login password ~5 times. This is a regression
from PR #456 — that fix addressed the 10-second polling loop but missed
a second cache-clearing path.

## Root Cause

`TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync()` clears `_resolvedGitHubToken = null`
on every recovery cycle (line 1339). Recovery is triggered by:
- Watchdog timeouts (token expiry ~1-8h)
- Wake/sleep health check failures
- Auth polling success → server restart

After clearing, the next `CheckAuthStatusAsync()` call sees
`_resolvedGitHubToken == null` → enters the lazy Keychain resolution
path → spawns `security find-generic-password -s copilot-cli -w` →
**macOS password dialog**.

**Re-reading the Keychain is useless** — the stored token is a static
snapshot from `copilot login`. If it expired, re-reading returns the
same expired token. Only running `copilot login` again would write a new
one.

## Fix

Remove the `_resolvedGitHubToken = null` from
`TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync`. The cached token is still forwarded
to the new server via `tokenToForward`. Only two paths now clear the
cache:
- `ReconnectAsync` — explicit user action (settings change)
- `ReauthenticateAsync` — explicit user action (Re-authenticate button)

When the token expires, the auth banner appears and the user clicks
Re-authenticate → fresh Keychain read (correct — user-initiated).

## Changes

| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `CopilotService.cs` | Remove `_resolvedGitHubToken = null` from
recovery path |
| `auth-token-safety/SKILL.md` | Update INV-A3 to reflect new invariant
|

## Tests
3064/3064 pass ✅

## Related
- Fixes regression from #456 (which fixed regression from #446)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
PureWeen added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2026
## Problem

PR #446 added Keychain-reading code (TryReadCopilotKeychainToken,
ResolveGitHubTokenForServer, RunProcessWithTimeout) to help users
whose headless server could not self-authenticate. This caused a
4-PR regression chain (#446#456#462#463):

1. Each /usr/bin/security call triggers a macOS password dialog
   (PolyPilot is not in the copilot-cli Keychain ACL)
2. TryReadCopilotKeychainToken tried 3 service names sequentially,
   each spawning a separate dialog (3× password prompts per call)
3. Clicking Allow/Deny rewrote the Keychain ACL, breaking the
   server own native keytar access
4. The server fell back to its own /usr/bin/security calls, creating
   a spiral of recurring password prompts every 1-2 hours

## Root Cause Analysis

The headless copilot server authenticates on its own at startup via
its native credential store. This has worked reliably across dozens
of worktree switches (different binary paths each time). The original
PR #446 user issue ("Session was not created with authentication
info") was a server auth loss that should have been solved by
restarting the server — which TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync already
does — not by reading the Keychain from the UI process.

## Changes

- Remove ResolveGitHubTokenForServer (Keychain + gh CLI reads)
- Remove TryReadCopilotKeychainToken (3-service-name loop)
- Remove RunProcessWithTimeout (only used by above)
- Remove _tokenResolutionLock SemaphoreSlim (guarded lazy path)
- Remove lazy Keychain resolution path in CheckAuthStatusAsync
- Remove sentinel logic (_resolvedGitHubToken ??= string.Empty)
- Simplify ReauthenticateAsync to just restart the server
- Keep ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv (env vars are safe, no prompts)
- Keep auth banner + Re-authenticate button (correct UX)
- Rewrite auth-token-safety skill doc with new invariant
- Remove 7 tests for deleted methods, keep 3 env var tests

## For users who cannot self-authenticate

The auth banner says: "run copilot login in a terminal, then click
Re-authenticate." Re-authenticate restarts the server, which picks
up the fresh credentials. This was the original PR #446 design before
Keychain code was added during review rounds.

Tests: 3057/3057 pass ✅

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
PureWeen added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2026
## Problem

PR #446 added Keychain-reading code (TryReadCopilotKeychainToken,
ResolveGitHubTokenForServer, RunProcessWithTimeout) to help users
whose headless server could not self-authenticate. This caused a
4-PR regression chain (#446#456#462#463):

1. Each /usr/bin/security call triggers a macOS password dialog
   (PolyPilot is not in the copilot-cli Keychain ACL)
2. TryReadCopilotKeychainToken tried 3 service names sequentially,
   each spawning a separate dialog (3× password prompts per call)
3. Clicking Allow/Deny rewrote the Keychain ACL, breaking the
   server own native keytar access
4. The server fell back to its own /usr/bin/security calls, creating
   a spiral of recurring password prompts every 1-2 hours

## Root Cause Analysis

The headless copilot server authenticates on its own at startup via
its native credential store. This has worked reliably across dozens
of worktree switches (different binary paths each time). The original
PR #446 user issue ("Session was not created with authentication
info") was a server auth loss that should have been solved by
restarting the server — which TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync already
does — not by reading the Keychain from the UI process.

## Changes

- Remove ResolveGitHubTokenForServer (Keychain + gh CLI reads)
- Remove TryReadCopilotKeychainToken (3-service-name loop)
- Remove RunProcessWithTimeout (only used by above)
- Remove _tokenResolutionLock SemaphoreSlim (guarded lazy path)
- Remove lazy Keychain resolution path in CheckAuthStatusAsync
- Remove sentinel logic (_resolvedGitHubToken ??= string.Empty)
- Simplify ReauthenticateAsync to just restart the server
- Keep ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv (env vars are safe, no prompts)
- Keep auth banner + Re-authenticate button (correct UX)
- Rewrite auth-token-safety skill doc with new invariant
- Remove 7 tests for deleted methods, keep 3 env var tests

## For users who cannot self-authenticate

The auth banner says: "run copilot login in a terminal, then click
Re-authenticate." Re-authenticate restarts the server, which picks
up the fresh credentials. This was the original PR #446 design before
Keychain code was added during review rounds.

Tests: 3057/3057 pass ✅

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
PureWeen added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2026
## Problem

PR #446 added Keychain-reading code to help users whose headless server
couldn't self-authenticate. This caused a **4-PR regression chain**
(#446#456#462#463) of recurring macOS password dialogs:

1. `TryReadCopilotKeychainToken` spawned `/usr/bin/security
find-generic-password` for 3 service names sequentially — **3 password
dialogs per call**
2. Clicking Allow/Deny on those dialogs **rewrote the Keychain ACL**,
breaking the server's own native keytar access
3. The server fell back to its own `/usr/bin/security` calls → **more
dialogs every 1-2 hours**
4. PRs #456, #462, #463 each fixed one trigger path but the core
approach was wrong

## Root Cause

The headless copilot server **authenticates on its own** at startup via
its native credential store. This has worked reliably across dozens of
worktree switches (different binary paths each time) without any
Keychain intervention from PolyPilot.

The original PR #446 user issue ("Session was not created with
authentication info") was a server auth loss that should have been
solved by **restarting the server** — which
`TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync` already does — not by reading the
Keychain from the UI process.

## Fix

Remove all Keychain-reading code entirely (**-612 lines, +42 lines**):

| Removed | Why |
|---------|-----|
| `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` | Keychain + gh CLI reads — triggers
password dialogs |
| `TryReadCopilotKeychainToken()` | 3-service-name loop — 3× password
dialogs per call |
| `RunProcessWithTimeout()` | Only used by above |
| `_tokenResolutionLock` SemaphoreSlim | Guarded the lazy Keychain path
|
| Lazy resolution path in `CheckAuthStatusAsync` | The whole Keychain
auto-resolution mechanism |
| Sentinel logic (`_resolvedGitHubToken ??= ""`) | No longer needed
without the lazy path |

| Kept | Why |
|------|-----|
| `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv()` | Env vars are safe, no prompts |
| `CheckAuthStatusAsync` + auth banner | Correct — shows "run copilot
login" guidance |
| `TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync` | Correct — restarts server which
re-authenticates on its own |
| Re-authenticate button | Correct — restarts server to pick up fresh
`copilot login` credentials |

## For users who cannot self-authenticate

The auth banner says: _"run `copilot login` in a terminal, then click
Re-authenticate."_ This was the **original PR #446 design** before
Keychain code was added during review rounds.

## Timeline of the regression

| PR | What it did | What went wrong |
|----|-------------|-----------------|
| #446 | Added Keychain reads to forward token to server | Triggered
password dialogs; corrupted Keychain ACL |
| #456 | Made Keychain reads lazy (only on first auth failure) | Still
fired on every server recovery cycle |
| #462 | Stopped recovery from clearing the token cache | Token was
never set in the first place (no env var) |
| #463 | Added sentinel on auth success | Server's own internal Keychain
reads still fired |
| **#465** | **Removed all Keychain code** | **The right fix — server
self-authenticates** |

## Tests
3057/3057 pass ✅ (7 tests for deleted methods removed, 3 env var tests
kept)

## Why server self-authentication works

The copilot headless server binary bundled inside PolyPilot.app and the
Homebrew `copilot` binary are both signed with the **same GitHub
Developer ID certificate**. macOS Keychain ACLs use code-signing
identity (not binary path) to control access, so:

- `copilot login` (Homebrew binary) writes the token to Keychain with an
ACL scoped to the GitHub Developer ID
- `copilot --headless` (bundled binary) reads the token via keytar —
**same Developer ID = no password prompt**
- PolyPilot's `/usr/bin/security` calls used a **different signer**
(Apple's built-in tool), which triggered the ACL mismatch and the
password dialogs
- Clicking Allow/Deny on those dialogs **rewrote the ACL**, breaking the
server's native keytar access — creating the regression spiral

This was verified via `codesign -dvvv` on both binaries — they share the
same Identifier, Authority chain, and team certificate. The Keychain
entry's partition list (visible in `securityd` logs) confirms it uses
team-id-based access control, not path-based.

**Conclusion:** The server has always been able to self-authenticate.
The only thing that broke it was PolyPilot calling `/usr/bin/security`,
which used a different code-signing identity and corrupted the ACL.
Removing those calls is the correct fix.

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
arisng pushed a commit to arisng/PolyPilot that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2026
## Problem
Users see an opaque error `Session was not created with authentication
info or custom provider` when the CLI server loses auth state, with no
guidance on how to fix it.

## Fix
- **Auth status check** — calls `GetAuthStatusAsync()` after init; shows
a 🔑 banner if not authenticated
- **Humanized error** — translates the raw SDK error into `Not
authenticated — run copilot login in your terminal, then reconnect in
Settings`
- **Banner UX** — follows existing fallback/health notice pattern with
Reconnect + Dismiss buttons
- **IsAuthError** — adds the new error pattern so it's properly
classified as an auth error

## Changes
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `ErrorMessageHelper.cs` | Humanize auth error message |
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | `CheckAuthStatusAsync()` + IsAuthError
pattern |
| `CopilotService.cs` | `AuthNotice` property, call check on init, clear
on reconnect |
| `Dashboard.razor` | Auth notice banner + dismiss handler |

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
arisng pushed a commit to arisng/PolyPilot that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2026
## Problem

After PR PureWeen#446 merged, a user reported: **"PP now restarts every hour or
so, and asks for my login password to authenticate to copilot-cli"**

## Root Cause Analysis

Three interacting bugs create a recurring password prompt cycle:

### Bug 1: Preemptive Keychain read at startup
`InitializeAsync` (line 932) called `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()`
unconditionally in Persistent mode. This runs `security
find-generic-password -s "copilot-cli" -w`, which triggers a **macOS
Keychain ACL password dialog** because PolyPilot is not in the ACL for
the `copilot-cli` entry (only the terminal `copilot` binary that created
it is). Every user saw this dialog on every app launch — even users
whose server could self-authenticate fine.

### Bug 2: Polling loop re-reads Keychain every 10 seconds
The auth polling loop at `Utilities.cs:916` called
`ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` whenever it detected auth went from
false → true. Since polling runs every 10s, this means:
- If the Keychain dialog **times out** (3s `RunProcessWithTimeout`),
token comes back `null` → server starts without auth → polling detects
no auth → **another dialog in 10 seconds** (tight loop)
- If the user clicks Allow, the token is static and will expire

### Bug 3: Static token expiration creates hourly cycle
The `gho_*` OAuth token forwarded as `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN` env var is a
**static snapshot**. The copilot CLI normally refreshes tokens via
keytar.node, but an env var bypasses that refresh mechanism. When the
token expires (~1h, aligned with `WatchdogMaxProcessingTimeSeconds =
3600`):
1. All sessions fail → watchdog fires after 2 consecutive timeouts
2. `TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync` restarts server with same stale
cached token
3. Server still unauthenticated → `CheckAuthStatusAsync` starts polling
4. Polling detects auth → calls `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` →
**Keychain dialog again**

Additionally, the `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` call in the polling
loop was the **one call site not wrapped in `Task.Run`** (the R5/R7
fixes covered `InitializeAsync` and `ReauthenticateAsync` but missed
this third site).

## Design Decisions

### Why not just remove Keychain reads entirely?
**Because it would regress the original PR PureWeen#446 fix.** The original
issue was users getting "Session was not created with authentication
info or custom provider" because the headless server binary cannot
access the Keychain (macOS ACL restriction — different binary path). If
we remove Keychain reads, those users have no way to authenticate —
`copilot login` writes to Keychain under the terminal binary's ACL, so
the headless server still can't read it. The Keychain read is the **only
fix** for users without `gh` CLI or env vars set.

### Why split into `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv` vs
`ResolveGitHubTokenForServer`?
To make the safety boundary explicit in the API:
- `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv()` — **always safe**, no subprocess, no
prompt, instant. Used at startup.
- `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` — **dangerous**, may trigger Keychain
dialog. Only called on explicit user action or after confirmed auth
failure.

The doc comments on `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer` now include a ⚠️
warning and reference the skill invariants (INV-A1, INV-A2) to prevent
future agents from calling it preemptively.

### Why lazy resolution in `CheckAuthStatusAsync` instead of just
showing the banner?
For users whose server genuinely can't self-authenticate (the original
PR PureWeen#446 users), showing a banner and telling them to run `copilot login`
doesn't help — they've already done that. The Keychain entry exists; the
server just can't read it. Lazy resolution means:
1. Server starts without token (no prompt)
2. `CheckAuthStatusAsync` detects auth failure
3. **First time only** (`_resolvedGitHubToken == null`): resolves full
chain including Keychain → one password dialog → caches token → restarts
server
4. If the restart works → user is authenticated with zero manual
intervention after the one dialog
5. On subsequent failures (token expiry): uses cached token, **no new
dialog**

### Why does the polling loop no longer re-resolve?
The polling loop runs every 10 seconds. Re-reading the Keychain on every
cycle means a password dialog every 10 seconds if the user doesn't
respond. Instead, the polling loop now uses `_resolvedGitHubToken`
(already cached from the lazy resolution or from `ReauthenticateAsync`).
Only the explicit "Re-authenticate" button triggers a fresh Keychain
read — that's an intentional user action where a password prompt is
expected.

## Changes

| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | Split `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer`
into env-only (`ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv`) and full version |
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | `CheckAuthStatusAsync`: lazy
full-chain resolve on first auth failure, auto-restart with token |
| `CopilotService.Utilities.cs` | Polling loop: use cached token only,
removed `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` call |
| `CopilotService.cs` | `InitializeAsync`: use
`ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv()` (no Keychain, no prompt) |
| `ServerRecoveryTests.cs` | Add test for `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv` |
| `.claude/skills/auth-token-safety/SKILL.md` | New skill: 9 invariants
from PR PureWeen#446 regression analysis |

## Behavior Matrix

| User type | Before (PR PureWeen#446) | After (this PR) |
|-----------|------------------|-----------------|
| Server self-authenticates | ❌ Password dialog at every startup | ✅
Zero prompts |
| Keychain ACL issue, first launch | ❌ Password dialog at startup | ✅
One dialog after auth failure detected |
| Keychain ACL issue, token expires | ❌ Password dialog every hour | ✅
No dialog (uses cached token) |
| Keychain dialog timeout (3s) | ❌ Dialog every 10s (tight loop) | ✅ No
loop (polling uses cache) |
| User clicks Re-authenticate | ✅ Fresh Keychain read | ✅ Fresh Keychain
read (unchanged) |
| Has GH_TOKEN env var | ✅ No dialog | ✅ No dialog (env-only at startup)
|

## Tests
- 3059/3059 pass ✅
- New test: `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv_ReturnsNull_WhenNoEnvVarsSet`

## Related
- Fixes regression from PureWeen#446
- Adds `.claude/skills/auth-token-safety/SKILL.md` with 9 invariants to
prevent future regressions

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
arisng pushed a commit to arisng/PolyPilot that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2026
…eWeen#462)

## Problem

Every couple of hours, the user gets prompted to "allow copilot-cli" and
must enter their macOS login password ~5 times. This is a regression
from PR PureWeen#456 — that fix addressed the 10-second polling loop but missed
a second cache-clearing path.

## Root Cause

`TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync()` clears `_resolvedGitHubToken = null`
on every recovery cycle (line 1339). Recovery is triggered by:
- Watchdog timeouts (token expiry ~1-8h)
- Wake/sleep health check failures
- Auth polling success → server restart

After clearing, the next `CheckAuthStatusAsync()` call sees
`_resolvedGitHubToken == null` → enters the lazy Keychain resolution
path → spawns `security find-generic-password -s copilot-cli -w` →
**macOS password dialog**.

**Re-reading the Keychain is useless** — the stored token is a static
snapshot from `copilot login`. If it expired, re-reading returns the
same expired token. Only running `copilot login` again would write a new
one.

## Fix

Remove the `_resolvedGitHubToken = null` from
`TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync`. The cached token is still forwarded
to the new server via `tokenToForward`. Only two paths now clear the
cache:
- `ReconnectAsync` — explicit user action (settings change)
- `ReauthenticateAsync` — explicit user action (Re-authenticate button)

When the token expires, the auth banner appears and the user clicks
Re-authenticate → fresh Keychain read (correct — user-initiated).

## Changes

| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `CopilotService.cs` | Remove `_resolvedGitHubToken = null` from
recovery path |
| `auth-token-safety/SKILL.md` | Update INV-A3 to reflect new invariant
|

## Tests
3064/3064 pass ✅

## Related
- Fixes regression from PureWeen#456 (which fixed regression from PureWeen#446)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
arisng pushed a commit to arisng/PolyPilot that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2026
…eWeen#465)

## Problem

PR PureWeen#446 added Keychain-reading code to help users whose headless server
couldn't self-authenticate. This caused a **4-PR regression chain**
(PureWeen#446PureWeen#456PureWeen#462PureWeen#463) of recurring macOS password dialogs:

1. `TryReadCopilotKeychainToken` spawned `/usr/bin/security
find-generic-password` for 3 service names sequentially — **3 password
dialogs per call**
2. Clicking Allow/Deny on those dialogs **rewrote the Keychain ACL**,
breaking the server's own native keytar access
3. The server fell back to its own `/usr/bin/security` calls → **more
dialogs every 1-2 hours**
4. PRs PureWeen#456, PureWeen#462, PureWeen#463 each fixed one trigger path but the core
approach was wrong

## Root Cause

The headless copilot server **authenticates on its own** at startup via
its native credential store. This has worked reliably across dozens of
worktree switches (different binary paths each time) without any
Keychain intervention from PolyPilot.

The original PR PureWeen#446 user issue ("Session was not created with
authentication info") was a server auth loss that should have been
solved by **restarting the server** — which
`TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync` already does — not by reading the
Keychain from the UI process.

## Fix

Remove all Keychain-reading code entirely (**-612 lines, +42 lines**):

| Removed | Why |
|---------|-----|
| `ResolveGitHubTokenForServer()` | Keychain + gh CLI reads — triggers
password dialogs |
| `TryReadCopilotKeychainToken()` | 3-service-name loop — 3× password
dialogs per call |
| `RunProcessWithTimeout()` | Only used by above |
| `_tokenResolutionLock` SemaphoreSlim | Guarded the lazy Keychain path
|
| Lazy resolution path in `CheckAuthStatusAsync` | The whole Keychain
auto-resolution mechanism |
| Sentinel logic (`_resolvedGitHubToken ??= ""`) | No longer needed
without the lazy path |

| Kept | Why |
|------|-----|
| `ResolveGitHubTokenFromEnv()` | Env vars are safe, no prompts |
| `CheckAuthStatusAsync` + auth banner | Correct — shows "run copilot
login" guidance |
| `TryRecoverPersistentServerAsync` | Correct — restarts server which
re-authenticates on its own |
| Re-authenticate button | Correct — restarts server to pick up fresh
`copilot login` credentials |

## For users who cannot self-authenticate

The auth banner says: _"run `copilot login` in a terminal, then click
Re-authenticate."_ This was the **original PR PureWeen#446 design** before
Keychain code was added during review rounds.

## Timeline of the regression

| PR | What it did | What went wrong |
|----|-------------|-----------------|
| PureWeen#446 | Added Keychain reads to forward token to server | Triggered
password dialogs; corrupted Keychain ACL |
| PureWeen#456 | Made Keychain reads lazy (only on first auth failure) | Still
fired on every server recovery cycle |
| PureWeen#462 | Stopped recovery from clearing the token cache | Token was
never set in the first place (no env var) |
| PureWeen#463 | Added sentinel on auth success | Server's own internal Keychain
reads still fired |
| **PureWeen#465** | **Removed all Keychain code** | **The right fix — server
self-authenticates** |

## Tests
3057/3057 pass ✅ (7 tests for deleted methods removed, 3 env var tests
kept)

## Why server self-authentication works

The copilot headless server binary bundled inside PolyPilot.app and the
Homebrew `copilot` binary are both signed with the **same GitHub
Developer ID certificate**. macOS Keychain ACLs use code-signing
identity (not binary path) to control access, so:

- `copilot login` (Homebrew binary) writes the token to Keychain with an
ACL scoped to the GitHub Developer ID
- `copilot --headless` (bundled binary) reads the token via keytar —
**same Developer ID = no password prompt**
- PolyPilot's `/usr/bin/security` calls used a **different signer**
(Apple's built-in tool), which triggered the ACL mismatch and the
password dialogs
- Clicking Allow/Deny on those dialogs **rewrote the ACL**, breaking the
server's native keytar access — creating the regression spiral

This was verified via `codesign -dvvv` on both binaries — they share the
same Identifier, Authority chain, and team certificate. The Keychain
entry's partition list (visible in `securityd` logs) confirms it uses
team-id-based access control, not path-based.

**Conclusion:** The server has always been able to self-authenticate.
The only thing that broke it was PolyPilot calling `/usr/bin/security`,
which used a different code-signing identity and corrupted the ACL.
Removing those calls is the correct fix.

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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